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guardian and was declaied the seller's quardian befoie a

was given; (c) the deed was signed by the seller after she was
declared incompetent; and (d) no judicial approval of the sale
nor confirmation of the sale was sought by the guardian?
2.

Did Mary Jane Freebairn have the mental capacity

to enter into a contract to sell her property to Russell Scott
and to execute a conveyance to him?
3.

Did the sale unfairly benefit Mr. Scott as the

dominant party to a confidential relationship?
4.

Should a constructive trust by imposed upon the

proceeds of Mr. Scott's sale of the land he traded for
Miss Freebairn1s property?
STATUTES REQUIRING INTERPRETATION
Provisions of Former Utah Probate Code:
§ 75-13-32. Duties of guardian of property. A
guardian of the property must keep safely the property
of his ward. He must not permit any unnecessary waste
or destruction of the real property, nor make any sale
of such property without the order of the court, but
must, so far as it is in his power, maintain the same,
with its buildings and appurtenances, out of the
income or other property of the estate, an deliver it
to the ward at the close of his guardianship in as
good condition as he received it, natural wear and
tear excepted* (Emphasis supplied).
§ 75-13-33, Power to sell, mortgage and lease. Every
guardian must manage the estate of his ward, frugally
and without waste, and apply the income and profits
thereof, as far as necessary, for the comfortable and
suitable maintenance and support of the ward and his
family, if any; and if such income and profits are
insufficient for that purpose, the guardian may sell,
mortgage or lease the real estate, upon obtaining an
order of the court therefor, as provided, and must

-2-

apply the proceeds thereof as far as may be necessary
for the maintenance and support of the ward and his
family, if any. (Emphasis supplied).
§ 75-13-41. Sales, mortgages and leases. When a sale
of the property a ward is necessary to maintain him or
his family, or to maintain and educate the ward when a
minor, or to pay the debts and expenses of
guardianship, or when it appears to the satisfaction
of the court that it is for the best interests of the
estate that the real or personal property, or some
part thereof, be sold, mortgaged or leased, the
guardian may mortgage or lease the same, upon an order
of the court; and the guardian without an order of
sale and without confirmation may sell such personal
property of the ward as is in decedent estates to be
sold without confirmation; and the guardian without an
order of sale, but subject to confirmation of the
court, may sell other personal property and the real
property of the ward. The provisions of this title
respecting the selling, mortgaging and leasing of the
property of decedents and the powers, duties, rights
and obligations thereby conferring and imposed shall,
as far as applicable, govern the selling, mortgaging
and leasing of property under guardianship (Emphasis
supplied.)
§ 75-10-2. Sale to be reported to and confirmed by
court. All sales must be reported under oath to, and
confirmed by, the court before the title to the
property sold passes, except as hereinafter otherwise
provided.
§ 75-10-3. Sales - Report and confirmation. The
executor or administrator may sell any property of the
estate without order of the court, at either public or
private sale and with or without notice as he may
determine, but must make return of such sales in all
cases; and if directions are given in the will as to
the mode of selling, or the particular property to be
sold, such direction must be observed. In any case,
no title passes unless the sale is confirmed by the
court.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
J. Russell Scott petitioned the Third District Court
for Salt Lake County on February 27, 1971 for a declaration
that Mary Jean Freebairn was incompetent and requested
appointment as her guardian.
March 22, 1971.

The petition was granted on

In April, 1983, Miss Freebairn brought an

action to terminate Mr. Scott's guardianship of her, for an
accounting of sums paid to and disbursed by Mr. Scott during
the guardianship, and for a surcharge for damages arising out
of the wrongful disposition of her property.

Mr. Le R Burton

was named as a defendant as a person who gave a bond to ensure
Mr. Scott's performance as guardian.

After a hearing in

October, 1983, the court removed Mr. Scott as guardian and
required him to prepare an accounting.

The court found that

Miss Freebairn remained incompetent, however, and ordered the
appointment of new conservators, (The enactment of the new
Probate Code changed the applicable nomenclature).

The

Department of Social Services was appointed conservator of her
person and substitute conservators were appointed conservators
of her estate.
The action for damages in the nature of a surcharge
was set down for hearing.

By order of October 28, 1987 the

Honorable John A. Rokich approved Miss Freebairn's retention of
counsel of record to represent the interest of her estate in
_4_

this matter.

The claim against Mr. Scott was the subject of a

hearing commencing January 12, 1988. On March 11, 1988,
Judge Rokich issued a Memorandum Decision with Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law, and a Final Judgment in favor of the
defendant was entered April 29, 1988.

This appeal by the

plaintiff followed.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

The sale of Mary Jean Freebairn1s property to

Russell Scott is invalid as a matter of law for three reasons.
First, Mr. Scott as Miss Freebairn's guardian, was not
permitted to purchase property of his ward.

Second, court

approval of the sale was never obtained, and the lack of an
order authorizing the sale invalidates it.

Finally, once a

guardian was appointed, Miss Freebairn lost the legal capacity
to validly deed away her property, and thus the deed she gave
to Mr. Scott was void.
2.

Even if the transactions were not invalid as a

matter of law, they fail because Miss Freebairn lacked the
requisite mental capacity to contract or execute a deed.

The

trial court's finding to the contrary is clearly erroneous
because the judicial finding of incompetency raised, at the
very least, a presumption of lack of capacity which was not
rebutted by the evidence.
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3.

If the transaction is not set aside for either of

the foregoing reasons, it should be nullified since it resulted
from a breach of a confidential relationship.

It is

indisputable that the plaintiff and defendant were parties to a
confidential relationship A presumption therefore arose that
the transaction was unfair.

This presumption was not rebutted

because the evidence was overwhelming that the property was
sold for less than its fair market value, that improper
deductions were taken from the purchase price, and that
Mr. Scott profited significantly by his acquisition of his
incompetent ward's property.

The very same property resold

less than a year after the disputed transaction for more than
twice what the plaintiff was paid.
4.

As Miss Freebairn's guardian, Mr. Scott is deemed

to have held her property in trust, and a constructive trust
should be imposed upon the profit he earned when he traded her
property for another parcel and then sold that parcel at a
profit.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1.

Plaintiff Mary Jean Freebairn and defendant

J. Russell Scott are first cousins.
sisters.

Their mothers were

They both inherited real property from a common

uncle, Samuel Russell in 1957, The property was undeveloped
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land at the mouth of Little Cottonwood Canyon in Salt Lake
County.

Mr. Scott inherited approximately four hundred and

fifty acres and Miss Freebairn, approximately sixty acres (Tr.
4-6) .
2.

Some time in the early sixties or previously/

Miss Freebairn began exhibiting signs of a mental disease which
has been variously described as paranoid schizophrenia or a
paranoid delusional disorder (Tr. 334-335; 486).
3.

Prior to January, 1971, Miss Freebairn made the

following assertions to Mr. Scott, which illustrate her
disorder:
A group of people she referred to as "the gang" or
"the Cannon Committee" was "after her."

(Tr. 55, 90). The

group included former governor James D. Cannon and his wife,
Elaine Cannon.
her."

(Tr. 61)

(Tr. 55)

spied upon.

She thought they were trying to "get

She thought she was followed (Tr. 59) and

(Tr. 56)

She believed that the editor of the

Deseret News, Mr. William Smart, deliberately placed
objectionable messages about her in the newspaper in the form
of cartoons and other material with hidden meanings to defame
her. (Tr. 56-57).
Miss Freebairn told Mr. Scott that her phone was
bugged and that there was a television camera placed in her
bathroom through which people observed her.
-7-

(Tr. 58).

Miss Freebairn indicated that she believed that she was
"watched over" by Stuart Udall who flew airplanes over her home
for her protection. (Tr, 61-62).

Mr. Scott was aware that

Miss Freebairn had written the Department of Justice, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation and Senator Frank Moss about
these problems.
4.

(Tr. 60-61, 63)

Miss Freebairn corresponded with a number of

people prior to January, 1971, about these matters, and some of
her letters were received in evidence.

(Exhibit 11, Tr. 60).

They include LDS Church authorities, law enforcement agencies,
Mr. Cannon and Mr. Udall.

In one letter she explained that

during a two-year period from 1966 to 1968 she was required, on
account of interference by the "Cannon Committee" to change
dressmakers, find a new physician, a new lawyer, a new
insurance agent, a new bank, and a new hair dresser (Ex. 11,
P. 0000124, Tr. 60), She also explained that in February 1967,
the Newspaper Agency Corporation had placed an industrial spy
on the staff of "Field and Stream Magazine" in New York in
order to force her to resign a job she had held for one month.
(Ex, 11, Page 0000128, Tr. 60), She stated that the Newspaper
Agency Corporation learned in November, 1967 that she was about
to hire a New York attorney to sue them but that the Newspaper
used cartoons of a threatening nature to let her know that she

^8^

could expect "evil consequences" for doing so. (Exhibit 11,
P.0000129/ Tr. 60). Examples of her correspondence which were
received into evidence are included as Appendix "A".
5.

Mr. Scott was told some time prior to July 1969

that psychiatric treatment had been recommended for
Miss Freebairn. (Tr. 64).
6.

During the 1950's and early sixties.

Miss Freebairn was intermittently a student at Columbia
University in New York City, but never earned a degree, and was
intermittently employed in the East and in Salt Lake City. (Tr.
262-267).

Her last employment in Utah was in 1960 with the BYU

Adult Education Center.

She believes she was required to leave

that job on account of negative reports to her employer from
her enemies at the Deseret News, and recalls that her employer
told her, "I don't think you're going to get beyond their
reach."

(Tr. 201).
7.

Miss Freebairn's first business dealings with

Mr. Scott ^-rcurred in June and October, 1964.
was in debt and needed to borrow money.

She told him she

She executed an

agreement in June to sell Mr. Scott ten acres of her property
which adjoined Danish Road, with an option to repurchase.
sales price was $3,000 an acre.

In October she was in debt

again and sold another five acres at the same price, with a
similar option to repurchase.

(Tr. 10-15).
-9-

The option to

The

repurchase was extended until September, 1965 because
Miss Freebairn believed that there were developers who wanted
to build another Disneyland on her property. (Tr. 15-16, Tr.
181).

No one on behalf of Walt Disney ever contacted Mr. Scott

about building another Disneyland on her property or his.
(Tr. 16).
8.

In 1966, Mr. Scott formed the Scott Investment

Corporation with himself as president, his wife as vice
president and Mr. Le R Burton as secretary/treasurer.
(Tr. 17). Mr. Burton was a realtor who represented Mr. Scott
in various real estate transactions, and, in addition to
serving as an officer in the Scott family corporation, had his
own real estate office in an office building owned by
Mr. Scott, where Mr. Scott's office was located.
9.

(Tr. 720-722).

Mr. Burton handled a sale of Miss Freebairn's

property to a Mr. Wilstead in 1967, which included a promise by
the seller to install a water line to the property. (Tr.
661-662).

Burton, as Miss Freebairn's realtor, knew she was

not personally able to install a water line but thought she
would sell other property to raise the funds to do so.
(Tr. 729).
10.

When Miss Freebairn was unable to meet her

obligation to install the water line, she went to her brother,
Samuel Freebairn for help.

(Tr. 214-215).
-10-

They entered into a

verbal agreement whereby Samuel Freebairn and his wife Agnes
Freebairn would purchase the bulk of his sister's remaining
property, develop the property, and pay her $3,000 per acre on
a "lot release" basis, with a minimum annual payment of
$7,000.

The agreement was later reduced to writing and the

property was made subject to a trust agreement with Security
Title Company.

(Ex. 32P, Tr. 213, the trust agreement is

attached hereto as Appendix "B").

Prior to the drafting of the

written agreement, Russell Scott assisted Mr. Freebairn in
installing the water line by loaning him money to purchase
material and by performing some of the labor.

The water line

was installed on the property which became subject to the
agreement with her brother, but moved water to the Wilstead
property.

(Tr. 376-377, 27-28).
11.

The trust agreement between Miss Freebairn and

her brother and sister-in-law was drafted by Herbert Halladay,
an in-house attorney with Security Title Company, on the basis
of information given to him by Samuel Freebairn in May, 1968.
Among his notes from that meeting placed in his file is the
statement:

"Russell Scott financed water lines and Sam

promised to pay him back."

(Tr. 378). The written agreement

itself, in the initial provision which recites the
consideration given by the party, states:

-11-

AND WHEREAS approximately one year ago
First Beneficiary (Miss Freebairn) verbally
agreed to sell and Second Beneficiary
(Mr. Freebairn, her brother) verbally agreed
to purchase said premises and Second
Beneficiary has heretofore caused said
property to be platted and engineered and
has installed some water lines which have
materially assisted First Beneficiary by
enabling First Beneficiary to ful-fill her
commitments to provide water to Robert
Wilstead and Clifford Green to whom she has
heretofore sold a piece of adjoining
property,
The agreement also provides that:
Second Beneficiary shall and hereby agrees
to pay all costs and expenses of said
subdividing including, but not limited to,
surveying, platting, engineering,
installation of water and sewer lines,
culverting, grading and surfacing of streets
and such other off-site improvements and
utilities as may be required, the intent
being that First Beneficiary shall be under
no obligation or expense in connection
therewith. Second Beneficiary further
agrees to indemnify and save First
Beneficiary harmless from any and all loss,
cost or expense which First Beneficiary may
suffer or sustain in connection with said
subdividing and improvements including those
heretofore installed and constructed. First
Beneficiary is aware of the fact that Second
Beneficiary has borrowed approximately
$15,000.00 from Russell Scott to finance the
construction of said off-site improvements
heretofore installed and Second Beneficiary
hereby agrees to pay the same.
(Exhibit 32 P, Tr. 213).

-12-

from Agnes Freebairn her interest in those lots along with the
assumption of the obligation to repay the balance of the money
Samuel and Agnes had borrowed to develop the property.

The

agreement provided that in order to secure payment by the
buyer, Miss Freebairn was to have no mortgage or remaining
interest in the property.

Payments of $275 per month were to

be made in the following manner:
All of the rights and benefits to seller
arising as a part of this agreement are to
be placed in a protective trust for the
purpose of safeguarding the assets and
welfare of the seller to the extent that the
income she needs for personal welfare cannot
be preyed upon by others. J. Russell Scott
is to act personally as trustee for such
trust and to receive all money and disburse
it according to the instruction of the trust
with general outline to be $200 per month to
seller including taxes and $75.00 to current
bills.
(Exhibit 12P, Tr. 748-750).
16.

Mr. Scott testified that the $8,000 credit on the

purchase price consisted of $6,000 which he charged
Miss Freebairn for a portion of the water line loan made to
Samuel Freebairn, and $2,000 in other debts.
17.

(Tr. 79).

Prior to signing the agreement, Miss Freebairn

had no advice from any attorney, or from anyone at Security
Title.

She testified that she was not prepared to discuss her

-15-

property and would sign the agreement only with the
understanding that a lawyer would look at it later.

She

testified that she did not understand how the purchase price
was calculated, and thought she should be paid more for her
property.

(Tr. 238-246).
18*

Miss Freebairn testified that she left

Mr. Burton's office without a copy of the agreement and later
went to Mr. Duncan, whom she regarded as "Russell's lawyer" who
told her she had already exchanged her property for an
unsecured note.
19.

(Tr. 246).

Miss Freebairn testified that she had hoped that

Stuart Udall would keep her from having to go through with the
deal since he had enough money to fly planes over her house
every hour, but that she was unable to reach him.
was sick about it.
20,

She said she

(Tr. 247-248).

On February 27, 1971, J. Russell Scott executed

under oath a Petition for Appointment of Guardian which is
attached hereto as Appendix "E." La Mar Duncan appeared on the
petition as attorney for the petitioner, Mr. Scott.

The

petition alleges, inter alia, that Mary Jean Freebairn is
incompetent and
is now living alone and is incapable,
without the assistance of some other person,
to properly manage and care for her
property, and by reason thereof, would be
-16-

likely to be deceived or imposed upon by
artful or designing persons . . . that it is
necessary that some fit and proper person be
appointed the guardian of said incompetent,
to care and properly manage the properties
and estate of said incompetent.
See, Appendix D.

The petition identified as her assets the sum

of $100.00/ her residence/ and real property described as "raw
undeveloped ground suitable for subdividing into home
sites . . . of the approximate value of $57/000.00 with an
annual rental value of approximately $600.00".

No mention is

made of the existence of a sales contract between Mr. Scott the
petitioner/ and Miss Freebairn/ the alleged incompetent.
Mr. Scott read the petition before signing it.

Mr. Scott took

no action to determine the value of the land which is described
in the petition other than to assign it the value of his
purchase contract.

(Tr. 100-101).

Mr. Scott admitted that

there was no change in Miss Freebairn's mental competency
between January 13 and the earnest money agreement was signed
and February 21, the date he made these allegations.
21.
held.

(Tr. 117).

On March 1/ 1971# a closing was scheduled and

However/ no deed was given by Miss Freebairn to the

Scott Corporation because it was recognized that the property
was subject to a trust agreement with Security Title Company
which needed to be terminated.

(Tr. 109). On that day
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Miss Freebairn telephoned Herb Halladay, the Security Title
Company attorney, who made the following notes about their
conversation:
Duncan wants Mary Jean F. to establish a
guardian for her. Alleges William Smart at
Deseret News is guilty of a conspiracy ag.
her. Russell Scott now tired of helping her
and only has done so in the past because he
wants her land. They offered her $500.00
per month income. She said $250.00 for her
and $250.00 for her nieces and nephews
college educ. Cut value of contract about
$20/000—forcing her to pay for water pipe.
William Smart involved in her life—very
complicated—the xeroxing she has done would
reveal the whole story. Sending people to
her house at all hours to entrap her. She
complained to Bruce McConkie and visit
stopped.
(Exhibit 41P, Tr. 398-391) (Appendix E).
22.

On March 2, 1971 Scott's petition for appointment

as Miss Freebairn1s guardian was filed with the Third District
Court.

The petition was granted by order of the Third District

Court on March 22, 1971.
23.

(Tr. Ill)

On March 23, 1971, Miss Freebairn herself

executed a deed conveying the property which had been subject
to the earnest money agreement to the Scott Investment
Corporation.

On the following day, March 24, 1971, J. Russell

Scott signed a deed on behalf of the Scott Investment
Corporation conveying the deed from the corporation to himself
personally.

(Tr. 113, Tr. 118).
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24.

In January, 1972, Miss Freebairn's property was

sold by Mr. Scott as part of a four-way exchange which had been
negotiated at least a month beforehand.

Mr. Jerry Young was

the purchaser of Miss Freebairn's property and paid $6,000 an
acre for it, more than twice the amount which Mr. Scott paid
Miss Freebairn for the property less than a year before.

(Tr.

123-128).
25.

As a result of the four-way trade, Mr. Scott

received title to real property located under an office
building which he had purchased previously.

He had previously

held a long-term lease of the same ground.

In addition to the

property he acquired from Miss Freebairn the year before,
Mr. Scott traded five acres of land which he had obtained from
Miss Freebairn as a part of the loan transactions in 1964. In
November, 1974, Mr. Scott sold both the office building and the
land under it in one package.

The building and ground sold

together for $777,909.68. According to his own records and his
accounting to the Internal Revenue Service, 27% of the combined
sales price represented the purchase price of the ground, or
$208,955.00.

(Tr. 128-136).

Mr. Scott paid Miss Freebairn

$89,564.57 in monthly payments of $250.00, the last payment of
which was made in 1981, for her property, which included the
credits for sums he claimed had been owing to her previously.
According to Mr. Scott's records, he miscalculated the interest
-19-

owing and overpaid Miss Freebairn by $7,967.63.

In addition,

during the period of his guardianship, Mr. Scott made various
payments to Miss Freebairn which he identified as loans or
gifts.

(Tr. 781-784).
26.

On November 16, 1982 Mr. Scott signed a Verified

Answer to a complaint in a collection action against
Miss Freebairn filed in the Third District Court.
Tr. 186-187).

(Ex. 30P,

In it he swore that he had read the document and

that its contents were true.

He stated in paragraph 3, as

follows:
Further answering and by way of affirmative
answer, heretofore, on the 22nd day of
March, 1971, the above-entitled court in
probate number 57693, adjudicated the
defendant an incompetent, because of certain
mental disorders; that defendant is
therefore unable to enter into any contract
whatsoever. Any attempts on the part of the
plaintiff are null and void.
(Tr. 188) (emphasis added).

A copy of Mr. Scott's Verified

Answer is attached hereto as Appendix M F M .
27.

When this action was filed against Mr. Scott and

Mr. Burton in May, 1983, Mr. La Mar Duncan appeared and filed
an answer on their behalf, again representing Mr. Scott in a
position adverse to that of Miss Freebairn.

(See Case File,

Document No. 0024, attached hereto as Appendix MG".)
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28.

Plaintiffs' expert real estate appraiser

testified that the real property which Mr. Scott obtained from
Miss Freebairn had a market value of $5,000.00 per acre at the
time of the transaction in January, 1971. He relied upon the
"comparable sales" or "market data" approach.
29.

(Tr. 445).

Relying upon the same approach (and excluding the

trust agreement between Miss Freebairn and her brother)
defendants' expert witness testified that the same real estate
was valued at $3,100.00 per acre at the time of the
transaction.

Using other methods which plaintiff contends were

objectionable, defendants' expert claimed a sales price of
$2,600.00 was consistent with the property's value.

(Tr.

597-600).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE SALE OF MISS FREEBAIRN'S PROPERTY TO
MR. SCOTT IS INVALID, AS A MATTER OF LAW.
A.

A GUARDIAN IS NOT PERMITTED TO
PURCHASE HIS WARD'S PROPERTY.

It is generally held that
where a guardian purchases the property of
his ward, directly or indirectly, the ward
may have the sale set aside without a
showing of actual fraud or injury, . . •
[and that] any investigation into the
fairness or unfairness of the
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transaction . . .or good faith of the
guardian in consummating the sale is
immaterial.
39. C.J.S. "Guardian & Ward", § 99 (1976); see also In Re
Estate of Howard's, 133 Cal. App. 2d 535, 284 P.2d 966 (Cal.
App. 1955); In the Matter of Guardianship of Eisenberg, 42
Wash. App. 761, 719 P.2d 187 (Wash. App. 1986).
This rule is a variant of the general rule of trusts
that
a trustee with power to sell trust property
is under a duty not to sell to himself
either by private sale or at auction whether
or not the trustee makes a profit
thereby . . . [and that] it is immaterial
that the trustee acts in good
faith . . . and that he pays a fair
consideration.
Restatement (2d) of Trusts, § 170 (1957).
This is the law of Utah as well, as articulated by the
Utah Supreme Court in Farley v. Farley, 19 Utah 2d 301, 431
P.2d 133.

(1967):

One who is a trustee cannot purchase or deal
with the subject of the trust nor place
himself in an attitude antagonistic to the
trust . . . This rule is unyielding and a
trustee may not, under any circumstances, be
allowed to have any dealings in the trust
property with himself or acquire any
interest therein.
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Id., 431 P.2d at 137-138.
Although an earnest money agreement was signed a few
weeks before Mr. Scott executed the petition to establish his
guardianship, the order of guardianship was effective the day
before Mrs. Freebairn executed a deed to Mr. Scott for the
property.

The purchase price was not paid in one sum but in

monthly installments which continued for over ten years.
Because the transaction in the present case involves such a
conveyance by a ward to a guardian, the transaction as between
Mr. Scott and Miss Freebairn is void.
B.

THE DEED FROM MISS FREEBAIRN TO
MR. SCOTT IS VOID FOR LACK OF
JUDICIAL AUTHORIZATION.

Even if a conveyance by a ward to a guardian were not
absolutely prohibited, no deed by the ward to the guardian, or
subsequent deed by the guardian to a third party, can be valid
in the absence of court approval.
Pertinent provisions of Utah's former Probate Code, in
effect at the time of the disputed transaction, have been set
forth previously.

In summary, former Utah Code Ann.

§ 75-13-32, which described the duties of a guardian, states
that a guardian must not

M

. . .make any sale of such property

[i.e., property of the ward] without the order of the court."
Utah Code Ann. § 75-13-32 (repealed and replaced 1975).
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Sections 75-13-33, and 75-13-41 reiterated the power of a
guardian to sell a ward's property only with prior court
approval or upon "confirmation" of the sale, Utah Code Ann.
§§ 75-13-33, 75-13-41 (repealed and replaced 1975).
Section 75-13-41 incorporated by reference to the provisions of
the Probate Code relating to decedents* estate for a definition
of approval by confirmation.

Utah Code Ann. § 75-13-41

(repealed and replaced 1975).
The confirmation provisions required that a verified
petition be filed by an executor stating the reasons why a sale
was in the interest of the estate, and, if the sale were by
private rather than public auction, proof that the property had
been appraised within a year and that the purchase price was at
least 90% of its appraised value, Utah Code Ann. §§ 75-10-12,
75-10-16 (repealed and replaced 1975).

If the court found that

the sale was not in the interest of the estate, it could vacate
the sale and order acceptance of a different offer.
Ann, § 75-10-15 (repealed and replaced 1975).

Utah Code

Most

importantly, it is clear that title to real property did not
pass unless the required return was made to the court and
unless an order of confirmation was issued:
§ 75-10-3. Sales - Report and
Confirmation. The executor or administrator
may sell any property of the estate without
order of the court, at either public or
-24-

private sale and without notice as he may
determine, but must make return of such
sales in all cases; and if directions are
given in the will as to the mode of selling,
or the particular property to be sold, such
direction must be observed. In any case, no
title passes unless the sale is confirmed bv
the court.
Utah Code Ann. § 75-10-3 (repealed and replaced 1975) (emphasis
added).
The Utah Supreme Court held under the old code that,
except as provided by statute,

M

. . .the general guardian is

not authorized to sell the property

of the ward or to make a

contract concerning the sale of the same."

In Re Hansen's

Guardianship, 67 Utah 256, 247 P. 481 at 484 (1926).

As the

Supreme Court of Kansas noted about a statute similar to ours
in In Re Younkin's Estate, 158 Kan. 431, 147 P.2d 726 (1944):
. . . the guardian of the estate may sell
any real estate of an incompetent whenever
it shall be determined by the court that
such sale is for the best interests of the
ward and his estate. It is therefore clear
a guardian's sale always remains subject to
the consent and approval of the probate
court. In the final analysis the sale is
therefore passed upon and in reality is a
sale by the court, the deed being executed
by the guardian of the ward, his legally
appointed representative.
Id., 147 P.2d at 729 (emphasis added).
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When Mr, Scott petitioned for a declaration that
Miss Freebairn was incompetent and sought appointment as her
guardian, he did not disclose the existence of an agreement
between himself and Miss Freebairn concerning sale of the
property.

Furthermore, he did not seek court approval for the

sale prior to Miss Freebairn1s execution of the deed.

In the

entire twelve and a half years of his guardianship of
Miss Freebairn, during ten of which he was doling out monthly
payments pursuant to their contract, he never sought court
approval of the transaction and never obtained an order of
confirmation.
The sale from Miss Freebairn to Mr. Scott was not
authorized or confirmed by the court and, therefore, was never
valid.
C.

MISS FREEBAIRN LACKED LEGAL
CAPACITY TO CONVEY TITLE TO ANYONE
AFTER A GUARDIAN WAS APPOINTED.

In most jurisdictions, a person who has been found
mentally incompetent and who has had a guardian appointed, is
rendered legally incapable of executing a valid conveyance of
his property, and deeds given by him are thus void.

See,

Gibson v. Westobv, 115 Cal. App. 2d 273, 251 P.2d 1003 (Cal.
App. 1953); see also. Citizens State Bank and Trust Co. of
Hiawatha v. Nolte, 226 Kan, 443, 601 P.2d 1110 (1979); Horton
v. Lothschultz, 43 Wash, 2d 132, 260 P.2d 777 (1953).
-26-

Other

jurisdictions regard such deeds as merely voidable and protect
good faith purchasers who were ignorant of the guardianship.
Under either rule, the deed from Miss Freebairn to Mr. Scott,
executed the day after the order of guardianship was signed, is
invalid.
The Utah Supreme Court has never directly addressed
the question of whether there are any circumstances under which
a deed given by a person adjudged incompetent can be valid or
whether such a deed is void or merely voidable.

The question

as it relates to the contractual capacity of an incompetent was
considered in the case of a person who had been declared
incompetent under a federal Veterans' Guardianship Act.

The

Utah Supreme Court noted in Home Town Finance Corporation v.
Frank, 13 Utah 2d 26, 368 P.2d 72 (1962), that the requirements
for appointment of a guardian under the federal act were more
lenient than those of our own statute and noted that Utah
statutes "probably required an adjudication that an adult
person is incompetent to manage his business affairs."
P.2d at 75.

id. 368

That case concerned the enforceability of an

agreement by the ward to pledge his car as security for a
loan.

The guardian, a bank, had only been given control of the

ward's bank account.

It was conceded by the lender that he

could not reach sums actually placed in trust with the
guardian.

However, the court held that under the federal act,
-27-

appointment of a guardian created a rebuttable presumption of
incapacity to contract, and that upon proof that the ward was
actually competent at the time he pledged his car, the
agreement could be enforced,

id. 368 P.2d at 76.

The contractual capacity question was also considered
by the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit applying Utah law
in Brisacher v. Tracy Collins Trust Company, 277 F.2d 519 (10th
Cir. 1960).

Because the trial court found that the ward had

ratified his contract after his capacity had been judicially
restored, the Court of Appeals did not reach the question of
whether in the absence of subsequent ratification the contract
would have been enforceable.

While recognizing that capacity

to contract and competency under the Utah Probate Code may have
involved different standards, the court observed that
It is of course fundamental that a ward is
not free to deal with his property when
under the shelter of a valid and existing
guardianship. Such indeed is the very
purpose of the guardianship and were the
rule otherwise the guardian could neither
execute his trust nor could third persons
rely upon the authority of the guardian.
The rule appears conclusive where the rights
of those who deal with the guardian are
concerned and where conflict exists between
guardian and ward.
Id. 277 F.2d at 521.
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In the Matter of Estate of Anderson, 671 P.2d 165
(Utah 1983), an incompetent person, after appointment of a
guardian, executed a deed from herself, to herself and her
guardian as joint tenants.

The invalidity of the deed was so

clear that the parties stipulated that it was null and void,
and the Supreme court affirmed this consent decree on that
subject.

Id., 671 P.2d at 169.
Where the deeds of an incompetent are regarded as

void, they are like forged deeds which pass no title even to
bona fide purchasers for value.

See e.g., Gibson v. Westoby

(cited supra); Olson v. United States, 437 F.2d 981 (9th Cir.
1971), cert, den'd 404 U.S. 939, 30 L.Ed.2d 253 (1971).

Even

if such a deed is voidable as to bona fide purchasers, it is
absolutely void when given in favor of the very person who
petitioned for establishment of the guardianship.
POINT II
MISS FREEBAIRN LACKED MENTAL CAPACITY
TO CONTRACT AND CONVEY HER PROPERTY
The trial court found that Miss Freebairn possessed
the capacity to contract at the time of the disputed
transaction.

This finding is clearly erroneous and should be

reversed.
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As noted, the plaintiff appellant contends that a
judicial finding of incompetency should render contracts and
deeds given by the incompetent invalid as a matter of law. At
the very least/ however, it is clear that the finding of
incompetency raises a presumption of lack of contractual
capacity which must be overcome by the party who seeks to
enforce the contract or deed.

See Home Town Finance

Corporations v. Frank, cited supra.

In this case, Mr. Scott

admitted that there was no change in Miss Freebairn's capacity
between January 13, the date she signed the earnest money
agreement, and February 27/ the date he signed the petition
alleging she was incompetent.

And, as noted, the finding of

incompetency had already been made by the time she signed a
deed.

It was therefore Mr. Scott's burden in the trial court

to overcome the presumption that Miss Freebairn lacked the
capacity to sell him her property.
The legal test of capacity to contract or to make a
deed are essentially the same.

The Utah Supreme Court stated

in Anderson v. Thomas, 108 Utah 252, 159 P.2d 142 (1945) that,
In ordinary contracts the test is, Were the
mental facilities so deficient or impaired
that there was not sufficient power to
comprehend the subject of the contract, its
nature and its probable consequences, and to
act with discretion in relation thereto, or
with relation to the ordinary affairs of
life?
-30-

159 P.2d at 146 (emphasis added).
This court held in the recent case of Anderson v,
Brinkerhoff, 756 P.2d 95 (Utah App. 1988) that,
The test whether a grantor has sufficient
mental capacity to make a deed is whether
the mental faculties were so deficient or
impaired that there was not sufficient power
to comprehend the subject of the deed, its
nature and its probable consequences and to
act with discretion in relation thereto.
Id., 756 P.2d at 100 (emphasis added).
This definition of capacity is essentially the same as
that given in Section 15 of the Restatement (2d) of the Law of
Contracts:
§ 15 Mental Illness or Defect
(1) A person incurs only voidable
contractual duties by entering into a
transaction if by reason of mental illness
or defect:
(a) he is unable to understand in a
reasonable manner the nature and
consequences of the transaction, or
(b) he is unable to act in a
reasonable manner in relation to the
transaction, and the other party has reason
to know of his condition.
Restatement (2d) of Contracts, § 15 (1979).
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When a question as to the competency of a contracting
party has been raised, a two part inquiry must be made.

The

first concerns the ability of the party to "understand in a
reasonable manner" the terms of the contract and the
consequences of entering into it.

The second inquiry concerns

the ability of the party to act reasonably in relation to the
contract.
As the commentators to the Restatement of Contracts
have noted,
Even though understanding is complete, he
may lack the ability to control his acts in
the way that the normal individual can and
does control them , . .
Restatement (2d) of Contracts, § 15, Comment 6 (1979).

In

other words, a person may be the victim of a mental disease or
defect which does not impair his cognitive ability to
understand the meaning of an agreement he signs, but which
impairs his ability to make a rational decision about whether
to sign it at all.
There was no dispute in the trial court that
Miss Freebairn suffered from a significant mental illness at
the time of the disputed transaction.

This was apparent from

her correspondence, from the observations of others, and from
her own testimony at trial.
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Plaintiff and defendant each called expert witnesses
to give testimony about Miss Freebairn's capacity to enter into
the agreement to sell her property.

Dr. Steven Golding, a

forensic psychologist and professor of psychology at the
University of Utah, testified on behalf of the plaintiff.

He

concluded that Miss Freebairn suffered from a pervasive disease
he described as paranoid schizophrenia.

(Tr. 290-295).

Dr. Golding explained his view of the effect of this
disease on Miss Freebairn's ability to act rationally in
relation to this transaction, as follows:
Q
So, what is your opinion about how the
mental disorder she suffered from affected
her ability to rationally understand the
contract and to act with discretion in
relation to the decision?
A
The easiest way to explain that is to
elaborate upon these motions [sic] of panic
and compulsion, and it's present in her —
it's present in her letters and it is
present in her deposition.
As Miss Freebairn told me, there are
times in her life when she feels relatively
less persuaded and hounded by this
conspiracy and times when she feels
relatively more hounded under the direct
threat of what might happen, for whatever
reason. And I suppose it would be a
combination of her real-life circumstances,
that is her financial fragility and her
delusional system that she was in, and
around the time beginning in around 1970,
actually from the letters, becoming more
increasingly panicked about two issues. One
is that they were really out to get her this
-33-

time, and they, meaning this "fabulized:
delusional group of people, and two that her
protector, Stewart Udall, wasn't coming
through. That's the only way I can describe
it, namely that she felt like she had very
few people she could rely upon. The major
person she hoped, as she says in her
deposition, none of them would have happened
if Stewart Udall would have come forth, come
forth and stopped hiding for whatever reason
he was hiding from her, probably didn't want
to be bothered. If he would only come forth
and help she would not be in such a
desperate situation.
And I think it is from a psychological
point of view just absolutely clear — and
she herself uses the word 'compel.' She was
compelled by an internal but rational —
[sic] that is to say delusional — belief
that she must do something to render herself
more viable. She expressed fear that at the
time the surveillance and counter
surveillance — I know it's an elaborate,
obviously crazy system, but that Stewart
Udall's willingness to covertly provide this
cover surveillance and protection which was
in some sense staving off the surveillance
and harassment by their conspiracy, that she
was basically convinced that he was — since
he would not come forth as she unceasingly
would ask him to and hoping that he would
and so forth, that she had little choice but
to sell off what she did not want to sell
off. And I don't think she did it with the
kind — obviously, in my opinion at least,
did it with the kind of consideration or
discretion or care or whatever that under
other circumstances she perhaps might be
capable of doing. I mean it was in a panic,
and the panic was caused by the delusional
system and by her mental disorder, and I
think that is abundantly clear from the
psychological perspective.
***
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Q
Do you think she was able to understand
in a rational way the consequences of what
she was doing when she signed that agreement?
A
I think she factually understood that
she was selling this property, but if we now
have to clarify what we mean by "rational,"
and perhaps that's the crunch issue here,
what constitutes a rational or reasonable as
opposed to factual kind of understanding, I
think it is clear from a psychological
perspective that she did not anticipate the
requirements of that kind of transaction in
the sense that while someone can certainly
do something stupid, and I guess the law
permits them to be stupid or even irrational
or impulsive, I don't think she had a lot of
choice in that matter.
. . . so, my professional opinion is that
she did not have the rational anticipation
of the nature of the transaction, although
she certainly understood that she was
selling land. I don't know if I can go much
further.
Q
Aside from understanding that she was
selling land, do you have an opinion about
whether she was able to make a rational
choice about whether it was in her interest
to sell her land or not in the way that
someone without this disorder would have
been able to make a rational choice about
whether or not to sell their land?
A
I have already used the words in some
sense confusion and fear and panic, and to
draw out the implications of that, I don't
think that an individual, in my clinical
experience, an individual who is in a very
real sense in the throes of an assault on
their existence is very capable of making
many choices at all except to defend
themselves in the only way that they know
how.
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When a different kind of paranoid
schizophrenic individual does some kind of
thinking out in public and/or assaults a
public person, they're not going to do it in
some sense out of choice; they're doing it
because these people are flying the
helicopters that are getting ready to bomb
their house, to use an analogy. So, the
meaning of the word "rational" implies that
there is a freedom of choice that one is not
under the influence of that kind of internal
or external coercion, and that in this case
the coercion, if there is coercion, is
primarily internal and delusional. So, in
my opinion it was not a rational choice. In
particular the nature of her letters and the
nature of her description of her mental
state at the time leads me to conclude that
her preference, her druthers obviously would
have been never to sell that land unless it
was absolutely necessary and as a way of
holding onto her heritage and so forth and
perhaps being able to turn it over to some
of her relatives when she died.
Clearly that was a knowledge — that's
unrealistic, given her financial
circumstances, but at that particular moment
in time I think that the only option or
choice that she saw as available — and I
don't know because I have no records made
available to me, nor I haven't been at the
trial — I don't know what the evidence has
been, what conversations took place at that
moment in time in terms of individuals
whomever they might be suggesting to her
ways out of her current financial
predicament, but she wasn't looking out at
the world and surveying it with anything
that I would call a free-and-rational
intellect.
Q

And that would include this contract?

A

Yes.
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(Tr. 304-310).
In sum, while Dr. Golding concluded that while
Miss Freebairn may have possessed the mental capacity to have a
factual understanding of the transaction, she lacked the
capacity to make a rational decision about whether or not to
enter into the transaction at all.
The defendant called as a witness Dr. John Malouf, a
psychologist who had previously testified about
Miss Freebairn's competency in 1983 when the court concluded
that she remained in need of a guardian.

Prior to taking the

witness stand, he had not considered evidence of her capacity
to contract in 1971, though he did cursorily review some of the
contemporaneous correspondence during a recess.

(Tr. 493).

In any event, on the critical issue, Dr. Malouf's
testimony did not differ dramatically from Dr. Golding's.
Dr. Malouf agreed that Miss Freebairn suffered from a "very
elaborate delusional process" which he characterized as a
"paranoid delusion disorder" rather than paranoid
schizophrenia

(Tr. 497). He admitted that a person who

suffered from this condition, even though she was intelligent,
might, while under the influence of the delusional system, be
unable to make a rational judgment about a particular
transaction:
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Q
Wouldn't you also agree with me,
doctor, that in the case of someone who had
either of those two disorders, and let's
assume that we're talking about a person who
has the delusional disorder and not
schizophrenia, isn't it true that a person
who suffers from the delusional disorder who
may be a very intelligent person may yet,
under certain circumstances, when influenced
by the delusion be unable to make a rational
judgment about a particular transaction?
A

Yeah, that's possible.

Q
So, such a person in a business
transaction, let's say, hypothetically might
be able to read and understand the contents
of a document, but for whatever reason that
person, under the effects of the delusional
system, at the point that person's ability
to rationally decide what to do in the
business transaction could be impaired?
A

Yes.

Q
And a rational judgment could be
totally absent depending on how that
delusional system affected that particular
circumstance; isn't that true?
A

Yes.

(Tr. 514-515),
However, his fundamental opinion about
Miss Freebairn's contractual capacity did not reach the
critical question of her ability to make a rational decision
about the transaction in question:
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Q
[Mr. Jordan:] Thank you. Now, I will
put to you a question that I asked before
that I think we have now laid the foundation
for.
Based upon your review of the materials
that Exhibit 11 and all the other testing
and interviewing that you did of
Miss Freebairn, all the information that you
have been able to gather about her and your
diagnosis, what is your professional opinion
as to her ability in the 1970, 1971 time
period to transact business intelligently?
A
Intelligently —
of —
Q

Now, again, to speak

Transaction, business.

Let me just —

A
I think she would have knowledge. She
would have had adequate knowledge to know if
she was selling something, what she was
selling, what she was receiving for it,
those sorts of specifics.
[Mr. Jordan:]

All right.

That's all I

have.
(Tr. 497).
The defendant, who had the burden of proving
Miss Freebairn*s capacity to contract, never rebutted
Dr. Golding's testimony that Miss Freebairn was unable to act
with discretion in relation to the transaction in question.
Even though the defendant did offer the testimony of
defendant Le R Burton that at the time of the execution of the
agreement Miss Freebairn seemed to understand the transaction,
Mr. Burton was the secretary of the corporation which was
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buying the property, the drafter of the agreement, and the
broker who earned a commission by selling the property.
Mrs. Agnes Freebairn testified that she was also present and
observed that Miss Freebairn completely understood the
transaction.

However, at her deposition taken just two months

before her trial testimony, Agnes Freebairn had no recollection
of being present at the signing of the document at all.
544-546).

(Tr.

Furthermore, Agnes Freebairn benefitted tremendously

from the transaction by being relieved of both the burden of
developing property she was incapable of developing, and the
obligation of paying off a development loan for which her own
home served as collateral.

(Tr. 529, 541-542).

If the testimony of the expert witnesses did not fully
resolve the question of Miss Freebairn*s mental capacity, the
notes of the conversations between Herbert Halladay, the
Security Title attorney, and Miss Freebairn on March 1, 1971
do.

She telephoned him on the day the closing of the sale was

scheduled.

The earnest money agreement had been signed six

weeks beforehand.

Mr. Scott had already executed the petition

for guardianship, but did not present it to the court for
filing until the day after the closing.

Mr. Halladay*s notes,

made at the time of their conversation, state, as follows:
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Duncan wants Mary Jean F. to establish a
guardian for her. Alleges William Smart at
Deseret News is guilty of a conspiracy ag.
her. Russell Scott now tired of helping her
and only has done so in the past because he
wants her land. They offered her $500.00
per month income. She said $250.00 for her
and $250.00 for her nieces and nephews
college educ. cut value of contract about
$20,000—forcing her to pay for water pipe.
William Smart involved in her life—very
complicated—the xeroxing she has done would
reveal the whole story. Sending people to
her house at all hours to entrap her. She
complained to Bruce McConkie and visits
stopped.
(Exhibit 41P, Tr. 398-391) (See Appendix "E").
This memorandum of the phone conversation between
Mr. Halladay and Miss Freebairn is the best contemporary
evidence of Miss Freebairn1s mental state, and it comes from an
impartial witness.

It establishes several critical points:

First, Miss Freebairn, as of March 1, did not appear
to believe that she had already entered into a binding
contract; she describes the transaction as though it were still
being negotiated.

Second, she did not have an accurate factual

understanding of the agreement; she refers to monthly payments
of $500.00 with $250.00 to be used for her nieces* and nephews'
education.

The earnest money agreement provides for payments

of $275.00 a month for her benefit and includes no reference to
payments to her nieces and nephews.
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Third, she expresses her

sense of being compelled to accept terms proposed by others,
i.e, "forcing her to pay for waterpipe."

Finally, and perhaps

most significantly, she intertwines her description of the
pending transaction with references to the conspiracy against
her, "William Smart involved in her life . . . sending people
at all hours to her home to entrap her . . ."

These references

substantiate Dr. Golding's testimony that the delusional system
deprived her of an ability to make a voluntary and rational
decision about the sale of her property.
As if this were not enough, Mr. Scott has already
admitted in a verified pleading that Miss Freebairn lacked the
capacity to enter into an enforceable contract (Tr. 188). It
is well-established that a party may not seek relief by
alleging certain facts to be true, and then take a different
position about the same facts in a subsequent proceeding.

See,

Condas v. Condas, 618 P.2d 491 at 495-496 (Utah 1980),
Mr. Scott stated under oath that on account of the mental
disorders which led to the guardianship, Miss Freebairn was
incapable of entering into a contract and that any attempt to
do so was null and void.

He should be estopped from taking a

contrary position in the case at bar.
The evidence that Miss Freebairn lacked the mental
capacity to contract or convey her property is overwhelming.
The finding of the Third District Court in 1971 that she was
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incompetent raised a presumption that she lacked contractual
capacity which was not overcome.

The trial court's finding to

the contrary is clearly erroneous and should be reversed.
POINT III
THE SALE OF MISS FREEBAIRN'S PROPERTY
SHOULD BE SET ASIDE BECAUSE IT UNFAIRLY
BENEFITTED THE DOMINANT PARTY TO A
CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP
An agreement to convey real property made by a party
with mental capacity to contract is still voidable if it was
entered into between parties to a confidential relationship and
unfairly benefitted the party in the superior position.
Furthermore, once it has been established that a confidential
relationship exists, the transaction is presumed to be unfair.
As the Utah Supreme Court stated in Bradbury v.
Rasmussen, 16 Utah 2d 378, 401 P.2d 710 (1965):
If a confidential relationship is shown to
exist, and a gift or conveyance is made to a
party in a superior position, a presumption
arises that the transaction was unfair; this
presumption has the force of evidence and
will itself support a finding if not
overcome by countervailing evidence. The
burden is upon the superior party to
convince the court by a preponderance (not
clear and convincing) of the evidence that
the transaction was fair.
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Id. 401 P.2d at 713.

See also Berrett v. Stevens, 690 P.2d 553

(Utah 1984); Johnson v. Johnson, 9 Utah 2d 40, 337 P.2d 420
(1959).
It has been noted that there are some relationships
which the law presumes to be confidential, such as,
parent-child, attorney-client and trustee-cestui.
Martsch, 590 P.d 298 at 302 (Utah 1978).

Blodgett v.

Otherwise, the

question is one of fact:
The doctrine of confidential relationship
rests upon the principle of inequality
between the parties, and implies a position
of superiority occupied by one of the
parties over the other. Mere confidence in
one person to another is not sufficient
enough to constitute such a relationship..
The confidence must be reposed by one under
such circumstances as to create a
corresponding duty, either legal or moral,
upon the part of the other to observe the
confidence and it must result in a situation
where as a matter of fact there is superior
influence on one side and dependence on the
other.
Bradbury 401 P.2d at 713.

In Blodgett v. Martsch, the Utah

Supreme Court stated that
If the circumstances are such that the
defendant could exercise extraordinary
influence over the plaintiff and the
defendant was or should have been aware that
the plaintiff reposed trust and confidence
in the defendant and reasonably relied on
defendant's guidance, then the parties are
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said to be in 'confidential relationship*
and the plaintiff's burden is considerably
diminished. 'A course of dealing between
persons so situated is watched with extreme
jealously and solicitude, and if there is
found the slightest tract of undue influence
or unfair advantage, redress will be given
to the injured party."
Blodgett, 590 P.2d at 302.

(Emphasis added).

The trial court made no specific finding that
Miss Freebairn and Mr. Scott were parties to a confidential
relationship, but found that the transaction was "fair and
without fraud or undue influence."

(See, Memorandum Decision

of Trial Court, attached hereto as Appendix "H".)
There can actually be no question that the plaintiff
and defendant were parties to a confidential relationship.

The

earnest money agreement itself refers to their contemplation
that Mr. Scott would act as "trustee" for Miss Freebairn.
Shortly beforehand, Miss Freebairn gave Mr. Scott a mortgage to
her home which he described as being for her own "protection."
(Tr. 53-54).

And, Mr. Scott testified that the reason it was

not necessary for the land being sold to serve as security for
his promise to pay for it was that Miss Freebairn "trusted" him
enough.

(Tr. 83). Of course, once the guardianship was

established, the two were by definition parties to a
confidential relationship.
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A presumption arose, therefore, that the transaction
in question unfairly benefitted Mr. Scott, and it was his
burden to prove to the contrary.

It is plain that he failed to

carry that burden.
The unfairness of the transaction is evident in
several ways.

First, there is no justification for a deduction

from the purchase price of six thousand dollars which the
agreement states "was previously invested in the subject
property."

Samuel and Agnes Freebairn quite clearly agreed, as

between themselves and Miss Freebairn, to pay for the water
line which was installed on the property under development and
which allowed water to be delivered to the Wilstead property.
Miss Freebairn*s property was still subject to that trust
agreement in January 1971. Agnes Freebairn owed that
obligation, and yet rather than obtain payment from her,
Mr. Scott charged it as a credit against the purchase price of
the property.
Second, Mr, Scott did not establish that the purchase
price itself was fair.

Plaintiff's appraiser testified that

the property was worth $5,000.00 an acre at the time of the
sale.

Mr. Scott paid approximately $2,600.00 per acre if he is

permitted the credit for the water line, or less than $2,400.00
per acre if that credit is not permitted.

Using the market

data approach, (and excluding the 1968 transaction between Miss
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Freebairn and her brother) Mr. Scott's own appraiser, Mr. Van
Drimmelen, after indulging in every presumption in his favor,
testified that the market value of the property was $3,100.00
per acre.

(Tr. 597-600).

Despite this conclusion, the defendant's appraiser
testified that he thought a purchase price of $2,600.00 per
acre was "within the range" of the fair market appraisal of the
property.

(Tr. 614). To reach this conclusion, however, he

relied upon irrelevant and inadmissible factors.

First, he

assumed that the cost of developing the property was the sum
that Samuel Freebairn borrowed, and projected the price per lot
which would have to be generated to make a profit on lot
sales.

This testimony was received over plaintiff's

objections, (Tr. 608-609), and in contravention of the rule
that where market data is available, evidence of the
profitability to an individual of a particular use of property
is inadmissible.
The Utah Supreme Court has held that in the ordinary
case, proof of "market value" should be used to determine the
value of property and that only where market data is lacking
should other methods be employed.

Southern Pacific Co. v.

Arthur. 10 Utah 2d 306, 352 P.2d 693 at 695 (1960).

It has

also been stated that, "[a]s a rule, evidence of the profits of
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a business conducted on land is inadmissible as evidence of the
market value of the land."

22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages, § 955

(1988) •
Not only was the appraisal method improper, but the
defendant's appraiser was simply asked to assume that Samuel
Freebairn's loan represented the development cost of the land
without any evidence that that sum was, in fact, the reasonable
cost of developing it.

(Tr. 609). The trial court did,

however, indicate that he would not rely heavily on this
evidence.

(Tr. 208).
Furthermore, the appraiser considered a written

appraisal done by another appraiser, Mr. Werner Kiepe, of the
same land in 1968 who indicated in his report that he relied
upon a "comparable sales" approach but failed to include in his
report the market data he relied upon.

When Mr. Kiepe was

called to the stand, he had no recollection of what market data
formed the basis of his opinion, (Tr* 557-559).

Plaintiff

objected to the admissibility of his appraisal since he could
not be cross examined about its foundation,

(Tr. 552-558).

Eventually the court excluded the written report, but allowed
the defendant's expert to note Mr. Kiepe's opinion that the
property had a value of $2500 per acre in 1968, exclusive of
improvements made by Samuel Freebairn.

The fact that neither

Mr, Kiepe nor defendant's expert could articulate the facts and
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data which underlay Mr. Kiepe's opinion, made it improper for
the expert or the court to rely upon that opinion.

Utah R.

Evid. 705.
Finally, defendant's appraiser lowered his view of the
fair value of the property when he included in his calculation
the transaction between Mrs. Freebairn and her brother, a
transaction which was peculiarly structured, which included
consideration such as the agreement to pay for the water line
which was not a part of the stated price per acre, and which
was not an arm's length transaction.

(Tr. 558-559).

A conclusion that $2,600 was the fair market value of
the property in 1971 is suspect to begin with in view of the
fact that Mr. Scott himself paid Miss Freebairn $3,000 an acre
for adjoining property in 1964.

But the most telling evidence

about the market value of the property is that less than one
year later, Mr. Jerry Young, a seasoned real estate developer,
paid $6,000 an acre for the very same land!

(Tr. 409).

Mr. Young said that $6,000 an acre was a fair price for the
land in January 1972.

(Tr. 427), and as a result of their

four-way trade, Mr. Scott acquired the land under his office
building, which he resold at a great profit to himself less
than two years later.

(Tr. 128-131).
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It defies common sense to contend that land which was
worth $2600 an acre in January, 1971, without any additional
improvements, was worth $6,000 an acre in January 1972.

It is

true that other developers built sewer lines on adjoining
property between those dates which improved sewer access to the
subject property but there was no evidence that this occurrence
was not reasonably expected in January 1971.
The transaction was unfair because Mr. Scott paid less
than the fair market value for the property and because he
deducted sums from the purchase price which he had no right to
deduct.

The plaintiff lacked the benefit of any independent

advice about the value of the property or the wisdom of
entering into the transaction.

And, by simply holding the

property and selling it in combination with a few acres he had
previously obtained from Mrs. Freebairn, Mr. Scott was able to
reap an enormous profit.
Mr. Scott failed to carry his burden of proving that
he did not unfairly benefit from this transaction.

It should

be set aside for this reason, if not for others previously
discussed.
POINT IV
A CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST SHOULD BE IMPOSED
UPON THE PROCEEDS OF MR. SCOTT'S SALE
OF THE LAND HE TRADED FOR MISS FREEBAIRN1S
PROPERTY
-50-

A constructive trust is an equitable remedy which
arises by operation of law to prevent unjust enrichment, when,
among other situations, a person "unjustly profit[s] through
fraud or the violation of a duty imposed under a fiduciary or
confidential relationship."

Carnesecca v. Carnesecca, 572 P.2d

708 at 710 (Utah 1977); see also, Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d
147 at 150 (Utah 1987); Hawkins v. Perry, 123 Utah 16, 253 P.2d
372 at 375 (1953).

One such fiduciary relationship is that

between a guardian and a ward.
(1953).

Utah Code Ann. § 22-1-1

In fact, it has been said that "in no relation, except

perhaps that of parent and child or husband and wife, are the
elements of confidence on one side and active good faith on the
other more essential than in the relation of guardian and
ward."

39 Am. Jur. 2d, Guardian and Ward, § 208 (1968).
A guardian/ward relationship is, by definition, a

trustee/beneficiary relationship for which trust law,
specifically provided by the imposition of a constructive trust
when a trustee wrongfully acquires trust property and exchanges
it for other property:
Where the trustee by the wrongful
disposition of trust property acquires other
property, the beneficiary is entitled at his
option either to enforce a constructive
trust of the property so acquired or to
enforce an equitable lien upon it to secure
his claim against the trustee for damages
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for breach of trust/ as long as the product
of the trust property is held by the trustee
and can be traced.
Restatement (2d) of Trusts, § 202(1) (1957).

Additionally/

Comment (a) to this section states.
Where the trustee by the wrongful
disposition of trust property acquires other
property which is or becomes more valuable
than trust property used in acquiring it/
the beneficiary is entitled to reach the
property so acquired and thus secure the
profit which arises from the transaction.
Restatement (2d) of Trusts, § 202(1)/ Comment a (1957).
Even in cases not involving trust relationships, Utah
courts have imposed constructive trusts broadly.
Constructive trusts include all those
instances in which a trust is raised by the
doctrines of equity for the purpose of
working out justice in the most efficient
manner, where there is no intention of the
parties to create such a relation, and in
most cases contrary to the intention of the
one holding legal title, and where there is
no express or implied, written or verbal,
declaration of the trust.
Parks v. Zions First National Bank, 673 P.2d 590 at 599 (Utah
1983) (citing, Powery, J., Equity Jurisprudence, § 1044 (1941))
(emphasis added).

Thus, under Utah law, a constructive trust

should be imposed liberally, in many situations to ensure
equity and prevent unjust enrichment.
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In the event that trust property has been re-conveyed,
the constructive trust beneficiary should be awarded the
proceeds of subsequent transfers, which can be accomplished by
tracing the property through an unlimited number of
transactions or changes in form if necessary.

In Re

Independent Clearing House Co., 41 Bankr. 985 at 1000 (Bankr.
D. Utah 1984) (affd in part and rev'd in part and on other
grounds, In Re Universal Clearing House Co., 62 Bankr. 118 (D.
Utah 1986); In Re Independent Clearing House Co., 77 Bankr. 843
(D. Utah 1987)).
Furthermore, it is well-settled that when the trust
property, or its subsequent proceeds, appreciate in value, the
profit should be included as proceeds and awarded to the
beneficiary.

76 Am. Jur. 2d, Trusts, § 254, (1975).

In a

treatise entitled "Remedies, it is provided that a plaintiff
may obtain "a considerable profit," and cited an example which
mirrors the facts of our case:
. . . if the defendant secured Blackacre by
fraud at a time when it was worth $10,000,
and then traded it for Whiteacre which was
worth $15,000, a constructive trust in the
plaintiff's favor on Whiteacre would net him
property worth considerably more than the
property he lost.
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Dobbs, Remedies, p. 242 (West Publ. 1973).

In fact, the United

States Supreme Court held in 1844 that "the rule in equity is,
that all the gain made by the trustee, by a wrongful
appropriation of the trust fund, shall go to the [trust]."
Oliver v. Piatt, 44 U.S. (3 Howard) 333, 61 L.Ed. 622 (1844).
Whether the transaction in question is set aside as
being void as a matter of law, or because the grantor lacked
the requisite mental capacity, or because it resulted from the
breach of a confidential relationship, the remedy is the same.
Mr. Scott is deemed to have held Miss Freebairn's property in
constructive trust for her benefit from March 1971 until
January 1972. When he traded her land for another parcel in
January 1972, he is deemed to have obtained that parcel in
constructive trust for her as well.

Additionally, when he sold

the second parcel in November 1974, he is deemed, by law, to
have received the proceeds for her benefit.
Thus the imposition of a constructive trust upon those
proceeds case is the proper remedy in this case.
CONCLUSION
The law has long recognized that some people suffer
from mental diseases which deprive them of the ability to look
out for themselves in business dealings.

Legal guardianship is

one protection afforded to such a person.

A guardian's job is

to exercise on behalf of the ward, the independent and informed
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business judgment which the ward is found incapable of
exercising for himself.

It would defeat the very purpose of

guardianship if the guardian were permitted to take control of
a ward's property and then exercise his business acumen in
relation to the property to reap a profit for himself rather
than for the ward.
Another protection for the mentally handicapped is the
rule that the law will not enforce an agreement unless each
party is able to make a rational decision about whether or not
to enter into the agreement.

Finally, the law protects those

who, on account of a special relationship, are less likely than
others to be able to bargain on equal footing and strike a fair
deal for themselves.

Notably, none of these protections is

contingent upon the intention or motive of the other party.
Mr. J. Russell Scott has earned a handsome profit for
himself by acquiring land from Miss Freebairn at a time when
she suffered from a serious mental disease and when he was
under a duty to act as her protector.

The benefit he obtained

by holding the property until an opportunity arose for an
advantageous sale, and doing the same with the parcel he
exchanged for it, should be returned to Miss Freebairn who was
forced for years to live on $250.00 a month while he enjoyed
the profit earned from dealing with her property.
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SELECTED LETTER OF FREEBAIRN
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March 25,

1970

Questions t o be asked of William Smart,
Executive Editor of the Deseret Newsi

!•

You are accused of perpetrating and carrying
out,

personally,

and with the assistance

of many of the employees of the Deseret News,
as w e l l as other individuals,

a criminal

conspiracy against Uiss iiary Jean Freobairn.
Will you comment about t h i s please•

2.

You are accused of obtaining Miss Freebaim *s
nail fron the Salt Lake Post Office
(1)

for the i l l e g a l purposes of burlesqueing
i t in cartoons in the Deseret News;
(2)

of copying i t ;

(3)

of circulating i t

to unauthorized persona.

7/ill you answer the following questions
with respect t o t h i s ,

pleasat

(A)

From whan have you obtained such authority.?

(B)

Why ha/e you copied and circulated
her mail?

(C)

To whom has i t been circulated?
(Supply a complete l i s t of individuals
wno have r<3Cr

sc her mail,

and render

an explanation of the intent
for which i t was given to them, )

00^0042

You are accused of having installed
in liiss Freebairn's home electronic devices
which enable you to audit her conversations,
as well as to h^ve installed electronic devices
on the telephones of members of her family.
Please explain (1)

the authority

by which you were able to place such equipment
in her home; (2) who supplied the equipment.

You are accused of having used the electronic
device in Uiss Freebairn!s home to put forward
improper suggestions to her. Will you comment
about your having tormented her with such equipment
for five years.

You are accused of having placed television
equipment in Miss Freebairn!s home,
with which you have entertained a group of lemi
men on closed circuit television.

Will you please

inform the Church as to the authority
by which this was done and the names of persons
whose homes are serviced by such television l i n e s .

0000013

You are accused of using the television
and electronic equipment in Miss Freebairn's
horns in order to follow her and annoy her,
and you have used Deseret News employees
to do this on the following occasions:
February 25, May 17,
July 9th, August 13th,

May 21st,

June 26th,

December S,

February 15, and March 17,

19^9,

1970.

Please comment.

You are accused of sending people to Miss Freeoairn's
home to harrass and annoy her, and this has occurred
in the past,
and March 22,

as well as recently on March 15th,
1970

You are accused of having sent men
to Miss Freeoairn's home for immoral purposes
on August 30, I969, February 2, 1970,
and March 25th, 1970, after which occasions
you have published cartoons which were both offensive
to and injurious to fehe reputation of Miss Freebairn.

Miss Freebaim has requested that you
and everyone involved in the conspiracy against
her be excommunicated, TO.11 you comment
about this,

please*
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During the past two years,
the Cannon Committee,

due to interference from

I have had to change dressmakers,

I have had t o find a new physician,
a new lawyer,

DR2SSKAX2R:

I have had to locate a nev« bank,

a new insurance agent,

On July 15,

lirs. Anne Norby,

1966,

and a new hair salon*

I had gone to the home of

1175 South 12th .Vest,

top over stretch pants

and I was wearing a w i t e maternity

(which i s a comfortable manner of dressing

that i s more characteristic of my clothing when I am in the
mountains a t our summer home than in the c i t y ,
in the company of my tiny nenhew,

but since I was

who was two years old,

I

f

had decided to wear things he couldn t ruin when he climbed.

The

maternity blouses are longer and more comnodious than ordinary
blouses,

and I have bought them for that reason).

Ly being at the dressmakers for a f i t t i n g of some new clothing
was l a t e r burlesqued by the newspapers,
pregnant.

who rumored that I was

I t was how I discovered that they were using

t e l e v i s i o n cameras in their techniques of snooping*

FhYSTGI/Jh

Dr. James Vebster,

508 East South Templo,

w o treatod mo

for pneumonia from January £0, I96S through January 2kth,

was

not unfamiliar with my problem with the Cannon Committee,
he had asked roe what might be troubling me,

because

and I had tried to t e l l ham

of the problem and of some of the d i f f i c u l t i e s I had experienced because
of constant harassment.
in examining me,

I t did not surprise me one day that

he became familiar.

But he was one of the few persons

who has indicated by a glance that our conversation was being listened t o ,
and I f e l t that he was trying to a s s i s t me through a d i f f i c u l t t r i a l .

OOOOi;: 1

BANK: University Branch of Walker Bank supplied members
of the Cannon Committee with a $1.00 overdraft,
long-since been paid,

which had

but which was burlesqued by the Newspaper Agency

corjnittee a t a time when my legal representative was in S a l t Lake
from Washington and was arguing with them over the condition
of my finances.

I believe Zane Morrison t o have been the person

who supplied them with the overdraft.

LA'iTYSR:

David E. Salisbury,

liA East F i r s t South,

been a roost loyal l e g a l adviser,
place a camera jn his o f f i c e ,

who has

allowed the Cannon Committee to

during conversations that I was

having with him that related to D. James Cannon.

I t was not

u n t i l l a t e r that I discovered that Mr. Salisbury and lir. Cannon
are business partners in a land development project in
Snyderville•

HAIR SAL0K:

David Kimball,

a t 31^9 Highland Drive,

who owns "David's Salon1'

who is a brother-in-law of

Herbert Price of the S a l t Lake Tribune,
one afternoon,

was combing my hair

when he received a telephone c a l l .

Without any provocation,

he began t o say things t o the person

on the telephone that were derogatory and disparaging of me.
Since his remarks were made in a tone of r i d i c u l e ,

I disregarded them,

but I learned through the Tribune and the News that what he did
was premeditated and was calculated to influence my l e g a l adviser,
who was l i s t e n i n g a t another place.

l£r. Kimball's behavior

represented an important development to me,

because i t indicated

that he had read l e t t e r s I had written and because he was .
privileged t o observe me by t e l e v i s i o n .
that my l e t t e r s were being c i r c r l a t j d ,

I have maintained
and that a lewd

c i r c l e of persons was being entertained by the camera
that i s in my home.

Except for his cutting my hair once a month,

David Kirr.ball i s an absolute stranger to me.

000C125

On three occasions,

persons h.ve come t o my hone

who were carrying hidden microphones for the purpose of interviewing
me for the Cannon Committee.

Their being here was l a t e r

caricatured.

I n January,

1966,

Howard 0. Lawrence,

a schoolteacher

who said he represented the U. S. Department of Labor,
of Uanoower,

Automation and Training,

Office

asked to interview me

for the purpose of discovering why people weren't accepting
the retraining programs offered by the government.

In doing s o ,

he took down s i x pages of very personal information concerning
my f-'nancial s i t u a t i o n ,

a l l of w; ich he delivered to the

Cannon Committee.

On June 20,

I967,

Dorrel L. Decker,

Prudential Insurance Company,
1962,

ana^ent for the

who sold me my present policy in

came to my home t o c o l l e c t a semj-annual oa^ment.

In doing s o ,

he asked ms what my opinion was of a woran

who could not give of herself completely to her husband.
KG pretended to bo hazing such a problem himself,

but he

r e a l l y wanted to sup )ly the Cannon Co-mittee with g r i s t for their m i l l .

Saturday,

October 7,

19&7*

^TS*

Keva

Hyatt Snow,

a person withtfiom I had worked a t Eitel McCullough Corporation
(my f i r s t job) came t o my home accompanied by another woman
on the pretext of paying a social v i s i t .

Because I h.;d believed that she h»d

been trying to contact me for this s p e c i f i c purpose prior to this
date

(she contacted me through n&r s i s t e r ,

which gave me a c l u e ) ,
r

who she had never met,

I hadn't acknowledged several Christmas

cards ?n$ ^lephone messjges from her,

sent over a three year periM,

but one day she had the cheek t o come uninvited,
afterward,

and

she supplied her information t o the Co-mittee.

U . S . D E P A R T M E N T OF LABOR
^^=
OFFICE OF MANPOWER, AUTOMATION AND TRAINING
WASHINGTON, O.C 20210

January, 1966

K. J. Freebarin
1505 South 5rd East
Salt Lake City, Utah

To Whom It May Concern:
The Department of Labor and the Office of Education are conducting a
study of Manpower Development and Training Programs. These two Federal
agencies have contracted with the National Opinion Research Center,
University of Chicago, for assistance in this effort. An important part
of this study involves interviewing persons throughout the country who
have participated in the manpower training program.
The information gathered on this study will be used to improve the
training program which is presently in operation, and training programs
which will be available in years to come. Your opinions and experiences
are vital to this study and can be of great assistance in the improvement of the program*
NORC is a non-profit research organization which has conducted surveys
all over the country for over twenty years. Their work is for research
purposes only. Of course, all answers and statements given to their
interviewers are strictly confidential. Names or other identification
are never used in their reports and will never be given to anyone else
for Any reason*
Thank you for your time and cooperation.
Sincerely yours,

Howard 0. Lawrenea

Pn: W-6815

C/UZ^l

C # vic^cfa^S

Director
OOOOIi

Police procoduros in Utah roquire that anyone who is guilty
(or suspected) of criminal conduct be kept under surveillance,
and when such a person movo3 to another oity,

the police

in his new neighborhood must be informed of the arrival
of the "criminal." This pertains also to places of employment,
as well as residences.
In February of 19&7>
with Holt,

* accepted a job

Rinehart and Winston publishers in New York.

1 was given the task of being the New Products Editor
for Field and Stream Magazine,

and I was assigned to

the Advertising Department, where I had a private office and
telephone*

The company had not been able to f i l l tnis

particular position for three months.

Consequently,

there was a backlog of work that kept me busy and to which
I devoted my lunch hour,

as well as an hour each morning,

which I was able to do by arriving at 6 a.m. instead of 9.
IVhen the Newspaper Agency Corporation discovered where I was,
an industrial spy named Miss Sonja Ratasky was placed
in the organization to sabotage my position,

She did this in much

the samo way that Mr. Kimball tried to ruin my l i f e by saying
things into the telephone that he had been tutored to say,
although he was a complete stranger to me. Hiss Ratasky came
to my private office and deliberately began to argue.

I t became

evident that the things she was s aying were things she had been
asked to say,

and although I had met the requirements of

the position to the extent that the observation was made by
my employer that I was "overqualified" for the work,

I was.foroed

to resign because of the unpleasantness that was created.
Kiss Ratasky was on the staff of the Adv* ** **ng Department
for less than a month.

Vfnen the Newspaper Agency Corporation Committee learned
in November of I967 that I was planning to hire a New York attorney
to represent me in a court action against them,

the members

used cartoons of a threatening nature to l e t me know that I could expect
evil consequences for doing so.

As a result,
through December,
January 3rd,

I remained in Southampton,

and I returned to Utah the week of

I96S.

In Southampton,

I rented a room from Lr. and llrs. Kenry Bis en off

a t 161 Hampton Road,
have been,

New York

and they were as hospitable as anyone could

but i t wasn ! t long before they began to treat me

in a manner that told me that they had been asked to keep
me under surveillance.

Anyone reading tms history might wonder whether
I was not able at some time to confront my enemies openly.
("A visible enemy can be subdued,

but an invisible foe

cannot ever be assailed,")

Fortunately,

by a miscalculation,

this secret system

revealed i t s e l f in a manner that could lead to i t s dissolution,
as well as the indictment of its leaders*

00001-3

\7hen the Committee observed in June of I966,

that 1 had

written a l e t t e r t o congratulate Wr. Stewart L. Udall,
Secretary of the Interior,

who gave the Commencement Address

a t Utah State University,

they appointed one of their members

t o w r i t e a l e t t e r to Mr, Udall that was derogatory of myself.

When lir. Udall

(who is a member of the Church

of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints and a cousin through
the Jacob Hamblin family of a cousin of mine through
the Russell family) treated me without any explanation
in an official way,

rather than to c a l l me "Vary Jean,"

•.s he had done when I ras a student at Columbia University,
I knew what had hap->ened. As a result of that intuitive direction,
1 kept writing to him.
bringing the charges
the open.

I implored him to a s s i s t me by
(whatever they might have been) into

(Onl; someone who has been a prisoner could have

understood my concern.)

Although Mr. Udall never responded

to another l e t t e r frcm me, he investigated the matter.

0000120

I t is my bolief that l&r, Udall has hoard a l l of tho charges
that havo boen made secretly against me and which have been
used to keep me from working:

i t is also my belief

.that he could verify to the Department of Justice that
(1)

the telephones of my family members have been monitored;

(2)

that television cameras have been placed in my homo, and

in other locations when the observing of my activities was
deemed to be necessary to the work of the Cannon Committee;
(5)

he could testify that my mail has been opened,

copied,

circulated and burlesqued between the Deseret News and the
Salt Lake Tribune\

(h)

he is ar/are of at least some of the

entrapment procedures that have been carried out against me and the
consequent fact that in order to have gained the cooperation
of the persons who have assisted the Cannon Committee in
i t s schemes,

i t was necessary for them to have spread criminal

libels and slanders against me; (5)

he knows that the

surveillance of me is a continuous process and has been operating
for at leant five years*

She dictionary defines tho verb "to pursue" as meaning
"to follow with intent to capture or k i l l . " I t is my belief
that because of the wilful destruction and malicious damage
that has been inflicted upon my l i f e by i t s members,

the

Cannon Committee has shown that i t i s morally not removed
from the perpetration of murder by any degree.

Unless something

i s done to dissolve the Committee and to divest the Newspaper
Agency Corporation of i t s power, the eonseauent loss of l i f e
could not be doubted*

OC0I31

Iho persons responsible for the repeated a t t a c k s upon
my r e p u t a t i o n ,

the harassment and worry,

as well as the

burlesque a r e

VJILLIAM S&1RT,

Executive Editor of the Deseret News,

who

I have never met and with whom I have never had a personal
conversation,
RQSELARY PEDERSEN,

a society r e n o r t e r for the Deseret News

who I have never met,

and to my knowledge have never seen,

but who a t one time was someone in whom D. James Cannon
was i n t e r e s t e d .
EVELYN BLOOD MAZURAN,

Society Editor of the Deseret News,

who was Society Editor when I was a society r e p o r t e r for the News,
from Hay t o December in 1953D. JAI.S5 Ciuvi.'ON,

now employed by a bank,

the Committee with my l e t t e r s t o him,

who supplied
which led t o the

opening and burlesquing of a l l of my mail,
ELAINE A. CANNON,

UT. Cannon's w i f e ,

and a r e p o r t e r

for the Deseret News.
ARTHUR C DECK,
H£riBi2tT PRICE,

Executive Editor of the S a l t Lake Tribune,
Promotion iknager of the S a l t Lake Tribune

ROBERT TOGDY, Business Editor of the S a l t Lake Tribune

Newsmen for the CBS Television S t a t i o n KSL who have
burlesqued "bathtub sequences" which served t o inform me t h a t
the "police procedures" of the Newspaper Agency Corporation
were a hoax and were being used for lewd purposes a r e
BOB WELTI

and

PAUL JAMES,

both of whom 1 haye never met.

The name of David Kimball,
be included here,

the hairdresser,

must also

because i t was a slip of his tongue that

informed roe that he had also been a witness to the television snooping.

I t goes without saying that i f an indictment is made aGainst
these persons,

i t will have to extend to the postmaster of the

Salt Lake post office*

0000133

APPENDIX B:

TRUST AGREEMENT
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1RUST AGREEMENT

1UIS AGREEMENT made and entered into this A/sJ~
day of June, 1968,
by and between MARY JEAN FR2EBAIRN hereinafter designated as "First Beneficiary";
and SAMUEL R. FREEBAIRN and AGM'.S S, KREEEAIRN, his wife, as joint tenants, hereinafter designated as "Second Beneficiary" «rd SECURITY TITLE COMPANY, a Utah
Corporation, hereinafter designated as "Trustee";

W I T N E S S E T H

THAT, WHEREAS, First Beneficiary is the owner of the following described
raal property, situate in the County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, to-wit:
^Beginning at a point that is North 89*54*10" West 193.975 feet from
the Northeast Corner of Section 2, Township 3 South, Range 1 East,
Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North 89°54,lO" West 10.025
feet; thence South 8°50'30M West 346.60 feet; thence South 83*18'
West 311.88 feet; thence North 11°25 , 20 M West 105.45 feet; thence
Worth 2*57' East 13.16 feet; thence West 402.70 feet; thence South
1042.492 feet; thence East 25.00 feet; thence South 652.241 feet;
thence East 961.00 feet to the East line of said Section 2; thence
North 0°06*54" East along said Section line 2126.105 feet to the
Westerly line of Wasatch Blvd.; thence along said Westerly line
Horth 2l P 46*25" West 520.315 feet to the point of beginning. Containing 37,6 acres.
EXCEPTING THEREFROM the following described portions thereof:
BEGINNING at a point that is South 0°06 , 54" West 1634.485
feet from the Northeast Corner of Section 2, Tcwnship 3 South,
Range i East Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence South 0*05'
54" West along the Section line 322.242 feet; thence West 470.00
feet; thence North 100.00 feet; thence North 42* East 299.05 feet;
thence Eest 270.54 feet to the point of BEGINNING. Containing
2.3 acres.
ALSO BEGINNING at a point that is South 0 , 06 , 54" West along the
Section line 1956.727 feet and West 470.00 feet from the Northeast corner of Section 2, Township 3 South, Range I East, Salt
Lake Base and Meridian; thence West 491.00 feet; thence North 595.00
feet; thence South 28* Ease 627.44 feet; thence East 196.43 feet;
thence South 41.00 feet to the point of beginning. Containing*
2.97 acres.X
Together with all water and water rights appurtenant to, ysed upon
or I D connection with said property.
SUBJECT TO Easeoents, Restrictions, Reservations and Rights of Way
appearing of record or enforceable in law and equity and t*r.&9 for
tha year 1968 and th«r«*tr*r.

AND WHEREAS approximately one year ago First Beneficiary verbally agreed
to tell and Second Beneficiary verbally agreed*to purchase said premises and
Second Beneficiary has heretofore caused said property to be platted aid engineered
and has installed some water lines which have iwteriall/ assisted First Beneficiary
by enabling First Beneficiary to ful-flll her cestuiensnts to prcvid* water to
Robert Wilstead and Clifford
Green to whom s-ie h;«s heretofore sold a piece of

.adjoining property, and
W1EREAS it is now the desire of the parties hereto to enter into this
written Agreement to facilitate the said sale and purchase of the premises, all
upon the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth and contained,
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises and for and in consideration of the mutual covenants, conditions and agreements set forth herein,
the parties hereto agree as follows:

I
First Beneficiary shall and hereby agrees simultaneously with the execution
hereof to convey said property to Security Title Company as Trustee free and clear
of all liens and encumbrances other than specifically 6et forth herein, for the
purpose and upon the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth and contained.
II
The Trust herein provided for is established and exists and shall be
operated for the purpose of carrying out the sale of said property by First Beneficiary to Second Beneficiary and otherwise handling the same to accomplish all
of the terms and conditions herein provided. Hie Trustee is hereby granted full
power to do ail acts necessary to accomplish the purposes of this Agreement.

Ill
The title in and to the above described property, shall constitute and
be designated as the "Trust Pioperty". The legal title to said property shall
be vested in said Trustee, except as hereinafter provided, and no legal interest
in and to said property shall be vested in either of said Beneficiaries, and their
and each of their rights hereunder are personal consisting only of the right to
enforce due performance of the terms and conditions hereof to be performed by the
other parties hereto. The Beneficiaries have not and shall not have any right or
power to apply for or secure the dissolution or termination of this Trust Agreement
or the partition or division of any of the Trust property in any manner except as
provided for herein.
IV
The First Beneficial Interest under this Trust is vested in MARY JEAN
FREEBAIRN.
The Second Beneficiary Interest under this Trust is vested in SAMUEL
K. FREE BAIRN and AGNES S. FREE BAIRN his wife, as joint tenants,
ALL monies coming into the hands of Trustee for disbursement to the
First Beneficiary shall be paid to them in accordance with the beneficial interests
set forth above.

?
First Beneficiary agrees to sell and Second Beneficiary agrees to purchase
the entire Interest in the Trust Property hereinbefore described for the total
purchase price of NINETY SIX THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED NINETY AND NO/100 DOLLARS
($96,990.00) which the Second Beneficiary agrees to pay to the Trustee herein for
the benefit of the First Beneficiary as follows:

-2-

The sum of SEVEN THOUSAND AND NO/100 DOLLARS ($7,000.00) or more
on the 15th day of June in the year 1969 and the sum of SEVEN
THOUSAND AND NO/100 DOLLARS ($7,000.00) or more on the 15th day
of June of each and every succeeding year thereafter until the
total purchase price has been paid in full. It is expressly
understood and agreed by the parties hereto that no interest shall
be charged or paid on the unpaid portion of said purchase price.
The parties hereto acknowledge that the total purchase price has
been determined on the basis of $3,000.00 per acre, there being
a total of 32.33 acres in said trust property. Second Beneficiary
expressly agrees that there shall not be paid hereunder to First
Beneficiary in the calendar year 1968 a sum of money in excess of
29X of the total purchase price of $96,990.00.
VI
All taxes and assessments levied and assessed upon and against said
property for the year 1967 and ail prior years thereto, shall be paid by First
Beneficiary, all such taxes and assessments for the year 1968 shall be prorated
between the parties as of June 15, 1968, and all subsequent taxes and assessments
levied and assessed upon and against said property commencing with the year 1969
shall be paid by Second Beneficiary.
In the event Second Beneficiary shall fail to pay before delinquent, any
such taxes, charges and assessments, First Beneficiary shall have the right to pay
the same and any payments so made by First Beneficiary shall be prima facie evidence
of the necessity therefor, and the amounts so paid shall be secured hereby and
•hall be repaid to First Beneficiary by Second Beneficiary on demand, together
with interest thereon at the rate of eight per cent (87.) per annum from the date
first paid by First Beneficiary until repaid. In the event said Trustee shall
receive notice in writing from First Beneficiary of any such payments said Trustee
shall not convey said property, or any part thereof, unless and until the repayment
thereof, with interest thereon shall have been made.
VII
Second Beneficiary shall not, prior to payment in full of the purchase
price herein provided for, allow any lien or any other claim of any kind or
nature whatsoever to be imposed upon or against said property which shall
affect any portion of said property not theretofore released from any claim
or interest of First Beneficiary as provided for herein. It is expressly
understood and agreed however that nothing in this paragraph contained shall
restrict the right of Second Beneficiary to sell said Trust property or any part
or parcel thereof on a deferred payment basis, it being further understood however,
that, there being no privity of contract between First Beneficiary and purchasers
of land from Second Beneficiary, that First Beneficiary shall not in any way be
obligated to have conveyed title to said Trust property except MS provided for
herein and shall not in any way be liable or obligated to said purchasers.
VIII
Possession of the Trust Property shall be delivered by First
to Second Beneficiary on June 15, 1968.

Beneficiary

DC
Second Beneficiary shall have and is hereby given the right from time to
time to subdivide portions of the property being sold and purchased hereunder, subject
nevertheless to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth. Second Beneficiary
shall and hereby agrees to pay all costs and expenses cf said subdividing including,
but not limited to, surveying, platting, engineering, installation of water and
•ewer lines, culverting, grading and surfacing of streets and such other off-site
improvements and utilities as may be required, the intent b»iing that First Beneficiary
shall be under no obligation or expense in connection therewith. Second Beneficiary
further agrees to inderanify and save First Beneficiary harmless from any and all less,
cost or expense which First Beneficiary cay suffer or sustain in connection vith said

subdividing and improvements Including those heretofore Installed and constructed.
First Beneficiary is aware of the fact that Second Beneficiary has borrowed
approximately $15,000,00 from Russell Scott to finance the construction of said
off-site improvements heretofore installed and Second Beneficiar*y hereby agrees
to pay the same. Trustee shall have and is hereby given the authority to execute and
have acknowledged all instruments and documents necessary to have subdivision plats
fully approved and plnced of record in the Salt Lake County Recorder's office,
together with the authority to execute upon request of Second Beneficiary any
subdivision restrictions that Second Beneficiary may desire or require. It is
agreed that the lots in any subdivisions developed by Second Beneficiary be of
any sire and acreage which Second Beneficiary may desire. The parties hereto acknowledge the fact that First Beneficiary is retaining title to two parcels of land
consisting of 2.3 acres and 2.97 acres which are excepted from the Trust Property
on Page i hereof and adjoin the Trust Property on the Southerly boundary. Second
Beneficiaries' proposed development involves the construction of a road adjoining the
same and First Beneficiary hereby agrees, when said road and other off-site improvements
are installed by Second Beneficiary adjacent to her two retained parcels, to immediatcl)
pay to Second Beneficiary her proportionate share of the cost thereof.
X
Ihe parties hereto acknowledge the fact the Second Beneficiary is purchasing said property for the express purpose of subdividing the same and selling
building lots. Second Beneficiary has heretofore had said property surveyed and a
preliminary subdivision plot plan prepared, installed certain of the off-site improvements and now has ready for recording an approved subdivision plat known as Russell
Park Subdivision affecting a portion of said property namely 6.987 acres and containing 17 subdivision lots.
The parties hereto recognize the fact that Second Beneficiaries' development
of said property will necessitate Second Beneficiaries obtaining fee title to said
property in*order to finance the construction of subdivision and off-site impiovements
, through a lending institution by means of a first mortgage. Therefore in order to
pjX^ facilitate and assist Second Beneficiary in their development of said property First
A ' w Beneficiary hereby agrees, and Trustee is hereby authorized and directed, upon receipt
+r^
of written request by Second Beneficiary, to convey to Second Beneficiary fee title
/* to the 6.987 acres which constitute Russell Park Subdivision when Second Beneficiary
'•*'
has obtained financing for the construction of the off-site improvements therefor
yi*
and has presented to the Trustee a mortgage or Deed of Trust to be recorded in the
^i Salt Lake County Recorder's office. Simultaneously therewith Second Beneficiary
^ J/** shall and hereby agrees to execute and deliver to Trustee a promissory note and
a
Deed of Trust in favor of Security Title Company as Trustee for First Beneficiary
in the sum of $20, 961.00 ( said amount being determined by multiplying the number
of acres in said subdivision by the per acre price of $3,000.00 which Deed of Trust
shall be so recorded immediately after the recordation of the aforesaid mortgage or
Deed of Trust for the off-site improvements to the end that said Deed of Trust in
favor of Security Title Company as Trustee for First Beneficiary shall be a good
and valid second Deed of Trust upon said 6.987 acres in a first and superior positio
over all other Hens and encumbrances except that of the lender providing the first
mortgage or Deed of Trust financing for the off-site improvements and possible liens
in connection with the improvements already constructed.
It is further agreed by the parties hereto that in the event Second Beneficiary has paid to the Trustee for the account of First Beneficiary three-fourths of
the $20,961.00 due to First Beneficiary for the said 6.987 acres and in the event
Second Beneficiary is not in default hereunder, and especially not In default with
respect to the $7,000.00 annual payments provided for in Paragraph V above, Second
Beneficiary shall have and is hereby given the right to record another subdivision
plat which shall be contiguous to Russell Park Subdivision and which shall not
contain more than seven acres. Second Beneficiary shall further be entitled to
receive a conveyance of said subdivision acreage upon obtaining financing for the
construction of off-site improvements and executing a note and Trust Deed in favor
of Security Title Company as Trustee for First Beneficiary, all in accordance with
the terms and conditions provided for above. Additional subdivisions, conveyances
and Deeds of Trust may be had upon the same terms and conditions provided for above
if all monies due by Second Beneficiary to First Beneficiary have bten paid except
one-quarter of the atonies due on the last preceding subdivision so conveyed and
mortgaged,

XI
Second Beneficiary when not in default hereunder shall at any time be
entitled to receive a Special Warranty Deed from the Trustee conveying and releasing
acreage and/or subdivision lots upon payment by Second Beneficiary to Trustee for
the account of First Beneficiary as follows:
(a) One (1) acre of land, or multiples thereof, for each sum of $3,000.00
paid and applied upon the principal balance due hereunder.
(b) In the event Second Beneficiary has recorded a subdivision plat or
plats with respect to any particular portion of said Trust Property and fee title
has not been conveyed and a second Deed of Trust executed,as provided for in
Paragraph X above, Second Beneficiary shall be entitled to receive from Trustee
a conveyance of any one subdivision lot for a sum of money the amount of which shall
be computed and determined by the use of the following mathantetical formulae: Ihe
total amount of acreage contained within the exterior boundaries of a particular
subdivision plat, ms determined by a competent surveyor duly licensed in the State
of Utah, shall be multipled by the acreage release price hereinbefore specified,
being the sum of $3,000.00 per acre, thus determining the total amount due to
First Beneficiary for the particular acreage Involved. The total number of lots
contained within the said subdivision shall then be divided into the total amount
of monies due to First Beneficiary and the quotient shall constitute the particular
release and conveyance price for all of the lots in that particular subdivision
plat. This formula is based on the presumption that all lots in a particular subdivision will be of approximately the same size and in the event this is not the
situation then the actual release price for each particular lot in that subdivision
shall be determined by the mutual written consent of the parties hereto. Once a
particular area has been subdivided and a subdivision lot release price thus
established the said release and conveyance price shall not be changed.
(c) In the event Second Beneficiary has recorded a subdivision plat or
plats with respect to any particular portion of said trust property and title has been
conveyed to Second Beneficiary and a second Deed of Trust has been executed and
recorded.from Second Beneficiary to Security Title Company as Trustee for First
Beneficiary as provided for in Paragraph X above, Second Beneficiary shall be
entitled to receive from Trustee a reconveyance of any one subdivision lot for a
sum of money to be determined and calculated on the same basis as provided for in
subparagraph (b) above.
Second Beneficiary shall have and is hereby given the right and option
to select and designate the particular acreage to be so released and conveyed
provided however, that after the first such selection is made, all future acreage
and/or subdivisions so designated must be contiguous. Also, it is agreed that
Second Beneficiary shall have and is hereby given the right to select any particular
subdivision lot or lots to be so released and conveyed. Second Beneficiary shall,
prior to requesting a release and conveyance of any acreage or subdivision plats,
furnish Trustee and First Beneficiary a certification from a surveyor duly licensed
In the State of Utah showing the location and amount of acreage in the event
acreage is so selected for release and conveyance, or in the event of a subdivision,
e subdivision plat containing a description of the exterior boundary thereof, and
the amount of total acreage contained therein, to the end that the parties hereto
and the Trustee may determine with certainty the release and conveyance price to
be paid by Second Beneficiary as provided for herein.
(d) All conveyances of acreage shall be free and clear of all encumbrances
except as herein mentioned and except as may have accrued by or through the acts
of neglect of Second Beneficiary. The parties hereto acknowledge the existence
of a first mortgage against the premises executed by First Beneficiary in favor of
Beehive State Bink having an approximate balance of SIXTY ONE HUNDRED* IWE^IY FIVE
AND NO/100 DOLLARS ($6,125.00)
which obligation shall remain the obligation
of and be paid by First Beneficiary to the end that all conveyances of trust property
to Second Beneficiary shall be free and clear thereof,
XII
In the event Second Beneficiary shall fail to comply with any of the
terms hereof cr fail to make any payment or payments when the same shall become
due then the First Beneficiary shall have, at her option, the right to serve
written notice upon Second Beneficiary to remedy tho default within thirty (30)
dsys after service of such notice, a copy of which sh*ll he served *:pan Trustee
by First Beneficiary, and should the Second Beneficiary fail to do so, then
and in tnat event, ail right, title and interert of Second Beneficiary in and
to said Trust property shall terminate without further nefcte* *11 mt»4o«;
th*rOr*(0T'-

paid by Second Beneficiary shall be retained by First Beneficiary as rent and
liquidated damages and as consideration for the establishment of this Trust and
all property theretofore released and conveyed, and Second Beneficiary agrees that
First Beneficiary may re-enter and take possession of all property not theretofore
paid for or released and conveyed, with or without legal process, together with
all improvements and additions made by the Second Beneficiary thereon, which
improvements and additions shall remain with the land and become the property of
First Beneficiary.Second Beneficiary becoming at once a tenant at will of First
Beneficiary, and in the event that possession of said property is not delivered
to First Beneficiary upon demand,Second Beneficiary shall be subject to ail statutory
actions for unlawful detainer. The interest of Second Beneficiary hereunder shall
be deemed terminated when written notice thereof, after expiration of said 30 day
period, has been filed with the Trustee for the First Beneficiary. In addition
and in the event of such default and termination, Second Beneficiaries shall and
hereby agree, within ten (10) days thereafter, to execute and deliver to Trustee
a Quit Claim Deed conveying to Trustee all of their right, title and interest in
and to that portion of said property not theretofore deeded to Second Beneficiary.
Trustee shall, upon receipt of written notice from First Beneficiary, after the
expiration of said thirty (30) day period, of Second Beneficiary's default and
upon request of First Beneficiary and without liability to anyone, convey by
Special Uarranty Deed to First Beneficiary all property not theretofore conveyed
which remainsvested in Trustee. First Beneficiary shall also have the right, at
its option, in the event Second Beneficiary fails to remedy its default within
the thirty (30) day period above provided, to declare the entire unpaid balance
due hereunder at once due and payable, treat this Agreement as a note and mortgage
or Deed of Trust, have the Trustee convey to Second Beneficiary title to all of the
property not theretofore conveyed to Second Beneficiary and proceed immediately
to foreclose the ssme in accordance with the laws of the State of Utah and have
the property sold and the proceeds applied to the payment of the balance owing,
provided howtver, that First Beneficiary shall not in any event have the right or
be entitled to have a judgment against Second Beneficiary for any deficiency which
may remain.
It is further understood and agreed that any default by Second Beneficiary
in the terms and conditions herein contained shall constitute a default with
respect to any and all notes and deeds of trusts executed by Second Beneficiary to
Security Title Company as Trustee for First Beneficiary in connection with the
conveyance of acreage contained within a subdivision plat for the financing of
off-site improvements as provided for In Paragraph X above and First Beneficiary,
shall have and is hereby given the right and option to foreclose the same pursuant
to the statutes of the State of Utah, provided however that First Beneficiary shall
not in any event be entitled to obtain or have a judgment against Second Beneficiary
for any deficiency which may remain,
XIII
It is covenanted and agreed by the First Beneficiary that her sole
remedy against the Second Beneficiary, in the event of default, is the right to
terminate this agreement in the manner hereinbefore provided, excepting that
First Beneficiary has a right of action against Second Beneficiary for the amount
of any unpaid taxes or other assessments as of the date of such termination, and for
any loss, cost and expense suffered or sustained by reason of any liens or encumbrances against the Trust Property which is repossessed or foreclosed upon by
Second Beneficiary,,
XIV
As between First Beneficiary and Second Beneficiary it is agreed that
should they default in any of the covenants or agreements contained herein, that
the defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses, including a reasonable
attorney's fee which may arise or accrue from enforcing this agreement MS provided
for herein.,
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XV
Hie Beneficiaries Jointly and severally agree that they will fully
pay, indemnify and protect, save and hold harmless the Trustee of and from
any and all suits, claims, demands, judgments, costs or expenses, including
attorney's fees and other obligations and liabilities of whatever nature that
the Trustee may for any reason or at -any time suffer, sustain, incur or expend
by reason of or in connection with this Trust or the administration thereof
otherwise than through its own misconduct or neglect. Said Beneficiaries
further agree that the Trustee shall not be required to pay or attend to the
payment of any claim, lien or encumbrance, including but not limited to taxes,
income, inheritance or estate taxes, or special assessments against the Trust
property unless instructed so to do and proceeds are received and made available
for such' payment, shall not be required to attend, to any assessment or valuation
of the property but all such services shall be performed and all expenses borne
by the Beneficiaries or their representatives.
The parties hereto further agree that the Trustee shall not be required
to commence or defend any suit in connection with this Trust or the Trust property
without its express written consent and unless and until there shall have been
paid to the Trustee a sum of money sufficient in its judgment to pay all costs
incurred or to be incurred in relation thereto including attorney's fees and a reasonable compensation to the Trustee for its services and the time of its officers and
employees spent in connection therewith.
As between First Beneficiary and Second Beneficiary, it is agreed that
all of the obligations of the Beneficiaries in this Section set forth are the
obligations of Second Beneficiary; provided, however, that the Trustee may look
to both of said Beneficiaries or any property or funds in its hands fcr the
compliance therewith ana to indemnify it and hold it harmless on account of
failure to make any payment to or to do any act that is hereinbefore set forth.
XVI
No person dealing with the Trustee shall be obligated to ascertain
whether or not the Trustee has exceeded its powers in any act it may perform or
cause to be performed incident to or in connection with its administration of
this Trust and the property described herein or any part or percel thereof, nor
to see to the proper handling, application, or disbursement by the Trustee of
any funds paid to the Trustee.
XVII
All instruments affecting any property Included In this Trust shall
be executed by SECURITY TITLE COMPANY, Trustee; provided, however, that the .
Trustee at its option may cause or permit such instrument to be executed by
some other person or corporation. The Trustee shall not be obligated to warrant
title to any property sold or conveyed by it except as against its own acts. Any
Deeds executed by the Trustee shall be made subject to any taxes, assessments,
liabilities or obligations existing against the Trust property at the time of said
conveyance.
XVIII
The ofcouctteg records or the Trustee shall at all reasonable times
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CU t t u t p t l •** 4UV?tft«sc*tf eoJ c-**r;tft etd* la coeatttlo* vitb tit* Trosr.
XIX
Ko •islrjocot or transfer of any interest of any party hereunder at any
tice shall be valid and blodicg upon the Trvstce until an executed original of
the assignment or other instrument evidencing the transfer has been filed with
end accepted by the Trustee and the Trustee's assignment fee paid therefore
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lug oiiU w h c * e s u c h interett may pass or be transferred by decree or
»f the t*lurt a n d t n c n o n * v u P o n satisfactory proof of the regularity and
V of th* proceedings in such matter being presented to the Trustee.
XX
jhfji Trust shall be exempt from the provisions and operations of
wform ft lacipal «n<* £«come Act of Utah.
jhl> Trust shall terminate upon conveyance of all of the property
Trusted * n accordance with the provisions hereof, and the distribution
of the funds In the hands of the Trustee to the person or persons
ad then* 0 *" accordance with the terms hereof. In the event said
y has tot o e c n conveyed by the Trustee within one year after the time
%
i*d in f«*r«Creph V for the last payment due to First Beneficiary the
may >' i o o n thereafter as practicable and upon payment of all of
~*s co*!** charges and damages for which it may become liable, convey
••perty <** t n e Second Beneficiary if the Second Beneficiary shall have
*# purcV s t price in full and any other amounts due and owing to First
tiary, *n t n e e v e n t said purchase price and any other amounts due
•Ing to T i r s t Beneficiary shall not have been paid prior to said date,
-u*tee sV1** have the right to institute an action in a Court of comjurisd^ t i o n t 0 determine the rights of the respective Beneficiaries
* con vey t n e property in accordance with the decree entered in said
i jhen f ^ decree shall become final and the statuatory time for appeal
„:«t ylMS paired. In the event of any such action being brought by the
«« the ' T u s t e e shall have a first and prior lien against the said
-r ?v for it3 attorney's fees and all costs and reasonable payment for
2* of it* officers and employees in connection therewith.
XXI
j t A agreed that time is the essence of this Agreement.
XXII

4 1 j n o t i c e s provided for herein shall be in writing and served
' ly OT **v depositing the same in the United States mail as c e r t i f i e d
h rer* rn r e c e i p t requested, and with postage pre-paid and shall be
: m i pl r 'i upon the date the same i s delivered to the addressee as disclosed
retur* r e c e i p t . All n o t i c e s to First Beneficiary shall be mailed to
3** JT*s/
&*£.*&&&<;
t-ClZ-A.
N rRv-3AIRN at /felSsuK
notir* t o Second Beneficiary shall be mailed to SAMUEL/4. FREEBA1RN and
FPXyAIRN at / / / £ » / c / * / > / » / & / ) , ? ; • ?
Sr^^fi<^ik
<XX?, /sW>
notir* t o Trustee s h a l l be addressed to SECURITY TITLft? COhtfAKY at 330 East
5alt
->uth.
Lake City, Utah. I t i s agreed by the Beneficiaries herein
., y^Cher singular or p l u r a l , that the above named persons r e s p e c t i v e l y
afk4 re hereby appointed and designated -as t h e i r representatives 2nd t h i t
,f p r i c e t o them s h a l l c o n s t i t u t e and be s e r v i c e of notice to a l l said
*rie*
XXIII
j t a tioderetood and agreed by the B e n e f f c U r l e s that Security T i t l e
It* jitUmr* mnd r*»lo}*c» rvika 00 rapraicotarloat or recencndaitoas
•re •» s s W f t # | * f i f # Urn « o * 4 l t l » « , | t t r a U a or d e s i r a b i l i t y , or eoy
?rt «*iUUtftg tfccrtto; iHat co s a l e s or promotional cas^etga* or
4 . | * say U a d t ! u l l includt the M = » of Security T i t l e Corpany at taking
i ^ cat i t l o a s . provided, hovcvcr, that the sase may d i s c l o s e the fact
r : : * T i t l e Cospaay i s acting as Trustee and v i i l issue t i t l e insurance
a.) such a d v e r t i s i n g and a l l n o t i c e s s h a l l c l e a r l y show that the
> t ot t h e i r agents are the authors thereof and the Itustee shall not
fa:any s t a t e o e n t s or representations made therein.
jotiv
;• s agreed by the p a r t i e s hereto that t h i s Trust Agreement nav be
• ptncled, provided, however, that said modifications end amendments
J: s i t i n g and shall be approved and accepted by the Beneficiaries and

executors, administrators, successors and assigns of the parties hereto.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have duly executed and delivered
this Agreement the day, month and year first above written.

f

P

MARY JEAN FREEBAIRN

SAMUEL R. FREEBAIRN

~r

g ? ^ » f ^

^

AGNES S. FREEBAIRN

^ ^^"i^L
^

ACCEPTED BY
SECURITY TITLE COMPANY
330 East Fourth South. Salt Lake City,

Utah

By:
By:
STATE OF UTAH

)
)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE •

S8,

)

On the « 3 A ^ day of June, A.D., 1968, personally appeared before me
KARY JEAN FREEBAIRN, a woman, the signer of the within instrument who duly acknowledged to me that she executed the same.

IS
Wotary Public

Residing in: - S - ^ * £ " ^ 6/f
l&s<.
My Conmission Expires:
H-22-7/

r

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
On the
day of June, A.D., 1968, personally appeared before me
SAMUEL R. FREEBAIRN and ACNES S. FREEBAIRN, his wife, the signers of the within
instrument who duly acknowledged to me that they executed the same.

Notary Public

Residing in:
My Consul is ton Expires:
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APPENDIX C:

EARNEST MONEY AGREEMENT

-61-

•
•
EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT AND OFFER TO PURCHASE
Thit may b# a Ugotly birring form, if not undtutood took othtr odvict

LeR Burton, Realtor

Salt Lake City

January 13

71

. r - . , * • « * * _ ^ ^ * . « ^ M ^ * « . .-*,.,- Scott investment Corporation
mM...OC.M,«
...200.00
.
TWO HUNDRED AND hD/lQQ
^
* m mm «
Check made direct to seller, Mary Jean Freebairn
* — - . — .,.,—— M M . — ^
,. As described in the attached Exhibit "A" wtlch hv this refp.rftnr.P
Is made a part of this agreement. All of mv interest In said property Is to be r^nveygd to
seller on or about February 1. 1971 and not later than M r a r h I. 1971
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A copy of all the papers and work w i l l be l i l e a In the office of LamarDuncan
«.
.
(] ,
'
Scott Investnent Corpi
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>u on home at 1503 South Third East.

^

py ^resident
(2) Curb and Gutter a s s e s s m e n t s for same property (3)
a judgement and c o s t s in the amount of approx $1240 presently existing against seller.
(4) Back taxes to the state of Utah that are limited to those now outstanding and are in the
approximate amount of 4 4 2 5 0 . 0 0 . It i s understood that buyer i s to pay J. Russell Scott $8,000
for money he h g | invested in subject property which debt i s separate from those listed above
and for whicWbuje r has recieved credit a s a reduction from the purchase price. All of the intere
of the seller in Russell park Development Corporation i s hereby assigned to LeR Burton as
consideration for the effecting of this tranaction. The purdiase of this property i s by an
agreernfeit to buyer and seller and the Deed i s to be given on p o s s e s s i o n date without any of the
subject property acting a s security for future payments. All of the rights and benefits to seller
arising as a part of this agreement are to be placed in a protective trust for the purpose of s a f e guarding the a s s e t s and welfare of the seller to the extent that the income she needs for persona!
welfare cannot be preyed upon by others. J. Russell Scott i s to act personally as trustee for
such trust und to recle\eall money and dlsparse i t according to the instruction of the trust
with general outline to be $200 per month to seller including taxes and $75.00 to current b i l l s .
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>chibit "A" For agreement of Sale to Scott Investment Corp. To be used to include descripion of land which is approximately 25 acres ana is arrivad at by taking the ongional amount
sold to Sam Freebairn and subtracting only that portion which has already been deeded to
UisseU Park Development Corp,
/the following described
reel property, eituete In the County of Selt Lake, Stete of Utah, to-wlt:
Beginning et a point that is North 89*54'10" West 193.975 feet from
the Northeast Corner of Section 2, Township 3 South, Range 1 East,
Salt Lake Base end Meridian; thence North 89*54'10" West 10.025
feet; thence South 8*50f30" West 346.60 feet; thence South 83"18(
West 311.88 feet; thence North 11*25*20" West 105.45 feet; thence
North 2*37' East 13.16 feet; thence West 402.70 feet; thence South
1042.492 feet; thence East 25.00 feet; thence South 652.241 feet;
thence East 961.00 feet to the East line of said Section 2; thence
North 0*06*54" East along aaid Section lint 2126.105 feet to the
Westerly line of Wasatch Blvd.; thence along*aaid Westerly line
North 21*46'25M West 520.315 ftet to the point of beginning. Containing 37.6 acres.
EXCEPTING THEREFROM the following described portions thereof:
BEGINNING at a point that is South 0*06'54" West 1634.465
feet from the Northeast Corner of Section 2, Township 3 Soath,
Range 1 East Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence South 0*06*
54" West along the Section line 322.242 feet; thence West 470.00
feet; thence North 100.00|feet; thence North 42* East 299.05 feet;
thence East 270.54 feet to the point of BEGINNING. Containing
2.3 acres.
ALSO BEGINNING at a point that is South 0*06'54" West along the
Section line 1956.727 feet and West 470.00 feet from the Northeast corner of Section 2, (Township 3 South, Range 1 East, Salt
Lake Base and Meridian; thence West 491.00 feet; thence North 595.00
feet; thence South 28* East 627.44 feet; thence Eaat 196.43 feet;
thence South 41.00 feet to the point of beginning. Containing
2.97 acree.
Together with all water and water rights appurtenant to, s-sed upor
or In connection with aaid property.
•

•

•

SUBJECT TO Easements, Restrictions, Reservations and Rights of Wa>
appearing of record or enforceable in lav and equity and taxes fot

A P P E N D II'

I1

I'kT'J'ION

]<OU

A l ' I ' ' ' I M I'M" P I •'!
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I'UARDJAN

Attorney f o r P e t i t i o n e r
706 P h i l l i p s petroleum B2dg.
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 6I4IOI
Telephone: 32&-?689

FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE
Salt U k e County Utah
; QigL Court

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE ST; T C" "TAK
IN AID FOR SALT LAKE COUNTX
PROBATE DIVISION

IN THE HATTER OF THE ESTATE AND
GUARDIANSHIP OF MARY JEAN FRESBAI C
an inconpetent

PETITION FOB APPOINTMENT
OF GUARDIAN

i>?o^o

TO THE HONORABLE DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATS OF UTAH
The p e t i t i o n of J . RUSSELL SCOTT, of S a l t Lake C i t y , S a l t Lake County,
S t a t e of Utah, r e s p e c t f u l l y r e p r e s e n t s ;
3: •
That the P e t i t i o n e r is; the cousin ur k'MlI JE (! N FREEH* IRN, ail j acorzpete it, ,
now of t h e a P < < -ii f«•• t v - K « w n VH.4m ,

1V~., u..t „.« t ^ - K..- wi-v i'K-.-"^^-* -

,-*.•-. .

;

-

*

j

been n a r r i e d j

a a i x^ ' .f l : v u i t a l ^ r o v~~ >s i - . ^ a t l e ^ *r:?,r, TI* *.* H aj&c;'. %ance of so:ig other
pers'-;.;« *o nr^yprly manage -ino Ccire f o r her proper*,*/, -r. c -A r e ^ o j

whereof,

r

wou3,i t ? l i k s ' y s" be deceived nr imposed upon by a r t f u l or d e s i g n : o r 'oersons.

3.
That tha s a i d incompetent b •**
.> ar. e s t a t e w i t h i n the Countv : f $Ji'\
c o n s i s t i n g of cash and r e a l :.»rcjperty, «aa- a::-

^r.rrtin^ .

Lsi.e

A.-premisst^:?..7 the

sura of $100.00; t h a t the- i n t e r s t -! - *.:- scid UARY JEAN FRESBALRN i n trvi rr.al
property which i s raw, imdeveloped ground,, s u i t a b l e f o r subdividing i n t o hons
B i t e s , i s of tha approximate value of $57*000*00j t h a t s a i d p r o p e r t y has an annual r e n t a l value of approximately 5600.00; t h a t .in a d d i t i o n t h e r e t o s a i d i n ccopetent i s t„v- v^iur: m le^ s j . ^ 1 ^ cf p, c e r t a i n hoae i n which she aorr .resides
a t 1503 5outr j r d iSast S t r e r - l , ^J.c Lak* C i t y , Utah, of the approxi2g.te value
of $12,OOQ 4 OGJ t-hat -said hom i.is an ar*:u;jL r e n t a l value of $900 .00*

I*.
That the only immediate relatives of the said M All JEAN FREE3£IH:% -'
following*
DEPOSITION
EXHIBIT

LALIA JUNE FREE3AIRN, a s i s t e r , who resides at 1511 South 3rd, East, Salt
lake City, Utah.
JOHN HAMILTON PffiSBAIRH, JH., a brother, who resides at 2006 East Crystal
Avenue., Salt Lake City, Utah.
AGNES STAM FREEBAJEJ, a sister-in-law, who .resides a t 11181 Jupiter Drive,
Salt Lake City, Utah; thai the said i!ART JEAN FKEEBAIRW resides at 1503 So2fn
3rd East in Salt Lake Hit)', Utah
That the Petitioner

.1 hll'flELL SCOTT, resides at 431 South 3rd East in

Suit L-iki City, lit ih,
5i
,

i'nat i t us necessary MMI ioma f.it and proper person UJ appointed the
guardian of said inconpetatit, tu can fur arid properly maaagu the properties
and estate of said incoapeti.utj mat, tnpre has xu t been appointed any perse-i or
persons AS such guardian b,y law t\r by WM] or by deed or cthe:rwis©«
I

That the Petitioner herein as a cousin of eaid inconpetent, i s entitled,
to Letters of Guardianship of the estate of said incompetentj that the saic
JOHN HUHIffOH FREEBAIRN, a brother, LALLA FBSEBA1RN, a 8 i n t e r , and AGNES ST Ail
FREERAIRNj a sister-in-law, have all consented that Petitioner aci a:s such
guardian,
WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that notice of t h i s application be given i n
the manner designs,ted by this Court and a time be set for the hearing of this
application and petition, <u;d that upon the hearing and proofs to be .adduced,
"that said petition 'be granted and that Letters, of Guardianship issue to hia and
that such other order may "be made as to the Court may seers i-e-aflonable and rroper
in the premises*

^

"*"""***

ATTORNEY. FOR PETITIONER

PETITIONER

STATE OF UTAH
COU.JTY OF SALT UKB.SS
J , KJS3ELL SCOTT, being f i r s t duly sworn, deposes and s a y s : t h a t
he i s the p e t i t i o n e r named i n and who subscribed the foregoing p e t i t i o n ; t h a t he
has read s a i d p e t i t i o n , .knows toe contents thereof and t h a t the same i s t r u e
of iii s own knowledge*

I ^
Subscribed arid, sworn t o bef

.

*

yf-yL^CT

ct r c c r u a r / j „ H? *

I r e s i d e i n Ss-Rriaake C i t y , U &ah
Ky commission expires J u l y 28LD, J"

APPENDIX E:

NOTES BY HALLADAY CONCERNING FREEBAIRN
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APPENDIX r . V E R I F I E D A N S W E R Q F S C Q T T
(Original Exhibit was executed, notarized
dad
certified, The copy included here is i denti cal bi it not
execu t ed, no t a r i z ed <• ri certified ,)

M-

LA MAR DUNCAN
A t t o r n e y for Guardian
818 Kearns B u i l d i n g
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 8 4 1 0 1
T e l e u h o n e 32 8 - 2 55 3

CIRCUIT COURT,
Ski T LAI<S COUNTY,

STATE OF UTAH

SALT LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT

)
THE CARTER HAWLEY HALE STORE,
I N C . , d b a WEINSTOCK'S,
Plaintiff,
vs.

)

A N S WE R

}

Civil

No.

£''- " "L ("

~^^~

)

MARY JEAN FREEBAIRN,
Defendant,

)
)

Comes now Defendant above named and through her duly appointed, qualified, and acting Guardian, J. Russell Scott, of
the person and estate of the said Mary Jean Freebairn, and
answers Plaintiff's Complaint as follows:
1.
Admits Paragraph 1 of Plaintiff's Complaint.
2.
Denies Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Plaintiff's Complaint on the
ground that Defendant is wholly incompetent and unable to comprehend the meaning of the contract heretofore entered into and
therefore said contract is a nullity.
3.
Further answering and by way of an affirmative answer, heretofore, on the 22nd day of March, 1971, the above-entitled Court
in Probate No. 5 769 3, adjudicated the Defendant an incompetent,
because of certain mental disorders; that Defendant is therefore
unable to enter into any contract whatsoever and the attempts on
the part of Plaintiff are null and void.
Wherefore, Defendant prays that Plaintiff's Complaint be
dismissed with prejudice.
Attorney for Guardian

-2-

STATE OF UTAH

)
) SS

COUNTY OF SALT FAKE )
J. RUSSELL SCOTT, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
That he i s the d uly appointed, qua1i f ied, a nd acting Guardian
of the person and estate of MARY JEAN FREEBAIRN., an incompetent;
that he has read the foregoing Answer to Plaintiff's Complaint,
knows the contents thereof and that the statements therein contained are true of his own knowledge, information, and belief.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this

day of November,

1982.

NOTARY PUBLIC
I reside in Salt Lake City, Utah,
My commission expires:
August 11, 1986

APPENDIX G.

ANSWER Oi LA MAR DUNCAN
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LA MAR DUNCAN
Attorney for Defendants
818 Kearns Building
Salt LaKe City, Utah 84101
Telephone 328-2 553

t U £ D !H C L E W S OFFIOf
SALT LAKE COUNTY. UTAH

Iter "3 I 56WW
III

;H. WJCON HINDLEY CLERK
5«o OIST. COURT.
r

IIY-'„;,•- _^DEPUTY CLERK
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY

MARY JEAN FREEBAIRN,
ANSWER

Plaintiff,
C i v i l No. C - 8 3 - 2 7 3 1

vs.
J. RUSSELL SCOTT, Etc., &
LeR BURTON, et al,
Defendants.
Come now Defendants and for answer to Plaintiff's Complaint
on file herein, admit, deny, and allege as follows:
1.
Answering Paragraph 1, Defendant, J. RUSSELL SCOTT, states
that he, as a first cousin of Plaintiff, was, at the request and
urging of Plaintiff, appointed Guardian of Plaintiff, an incompetent.
2.
Admit Paragraphs 2, 3, 4, andr5 of Plaintiff's Complaint.
3.
Deny Paragraph 6 of Plaintiff's Complaint.
4.
Answering Paragraph 7, Defendants allege that the primary
business of Scott Investment Corporation was and is investments.

5.
Admit Paragraph 8 of Plaintiff's Complaint.
6.
Defendants deny any urging on the part of Defendant Scott
and allege the ward Freebairn did all the urging.
7.
Deny Paragraph 10 of Plaintiff's Complaint.
8.
Admit Paragraph 11 of Plaintiff's Complaint and further
allege that she is still incompetent and subject to acts of
artful and designing persons.
9.
Admit Paragraph 12 of Plaintiff's Complaint.
10.
Deny allegations in Plaintiff's Paragraph 13 that the
ward signed the closing paper on March 1, 1971; admit rest of
Paragraph 13.
11.
Deny Paragraphs 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, through
Paragraph' 62.
12.
Admit Paragraphs 63, 64, and 65 of Plaintiff's 10th Cause
of Action.
13.
Admit Paragraph 66 of Plaintiff's 11th Cause of Action.

-314.
Deny Paragraphs 67 through Paragraph 72 of Plaintiff's
voluminous and wordy Complaint.
WHEREFORE, Defendants pray that Plaintiff's Complaint be
dismissed; that Defendant, J. Russell Scott, as the only living
and caring relative, either be continued as Guardian of Plaintiff or that some other suitable person or institution that has
no artful design upon the welfare or property of Plaintiff be
appointed to continue to-act as her Guardian.

-Attorney for Defendants

' /f
Defendant
STATE OF UTAH

)
) SS
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
On the

>^

day of May, 1983, personally appeared before

me, j m RUSSELL SCOTT, one of the Defendants and the signer of
the foregoing Instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that he
executed the same.

a\a » /--/f^V^^^^""c^^
^/
NOTARY PUBLIC
I r e s i d e i n Sal^b^Iiake C i t y ,

My commission expires:
August 11, 1986

Utah.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MARY JEAN FREEBAIRN,

:

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiff,

:

PROBATE NO. 57693

vs.

:

J. RUSSELL SCOTT,

:

Defendant.

5

The above-entitled matter was tried on the 12th day of
January, 1988.
Barnard

and

Plaintiff was present and represented by Brian M.

Timothy

C.

Houpt.

represented by David J. Jordan.

Defendant

was

present

and

The Court heard the testimony of

witnesses and admitted documentary evidence.

At the conclusion

of the trial the Court advised counsel that closing arguments
would be continued to a future date.
1988,

counsel

arguments*
Court

respective parties made their closing

The Court took the matter under advisement.

having

Memoranda

for the

On the 29th day of January,

on

had

an

opportunity

to

review

file, the exhibits admitted,

its

notes,

The
the

and the pertinent

authorities cited, now renders its decision.
The Court finds as follows:
1.

Plaintiff and defendant are first cousins who inherited

real property located near the mouth of Big Cottonwood Canyon
from their uncle.

FREEBAIRN V. SCOTT

2.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

PAGE TWO

Defendant inherited 400 acres and plaintiff inherited

60 acres from their uncle.
3.

Plaintiff,

during

the

1960 's,

sold

15

acres

to

defendant.
4.

Plaintiff in 1968, entered into a trust agreement with

her brother Samuel Freebairn and his wife Agnes Freebairn for the
purpose of developing their respective properties.
5.

Samuel Freebairn encumbered the land by a mortgage in

favor of Beehive State Bank for $50,000.00.
6.

Samuel Freebairn died on July 30, 1969, and as a result

of his death Agnes Freebairn was unable to develop the property
or make the payments on the mortgage or pay the property taxes.
7.

The

1968

trust

agreement

was

prepared

by

Herbert

Halliday, attorney for Security Title Co., who was charged with
the administration of the trust.
8.

At the time of the creation of the 1968 trust agreement

there was no evidence presented that at that time plaintiff was
not competent to contract.
9.
Freebairn

The 1968 trust was terminated by plaintiff and Agnes
in

March

of

1971.

Mr.

Halliday

handled

the

termination, but did not make a determination as to plaintiff's
mental status at that time.

FREEBAIRN V* SCOTT

10.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

PAGE THREE

Plaintiff

and

Agnes

Freebairn,

facing

the

risk of

losing the property which was the subject matter of the 1968
trust agreement, agreed to sell the property.
11.

Plaintiff

and

Agnes

Burton to sell the property.

Freebairn

contracted

with

LeR

Mr. Burton listed the property for

sale on the multiple listing book, and advertised the same in a
newspaper of state-wide circulation.
12.

Plaintiff

and Agnes Freebairn established

an asking

price, and sought out defendant to purchase the property.
13.
Money

Defendant on January 13, 1971 entered into an Earnest

Agreement

defendant,

with

Scott

Investment

and Agnes Freebairn

Corporation,

owned by

for the sale and purchase of

approximately 25 acres for $65,000.00, with interest at the rate
of 6% per annum.
14.

Plaintiff had transacted a number of loans and sales of

parcels of land prior to this particular transaction, and there
was no evidence presented that she didn't understand the nature
of the transactions,
15.

The

Earnest

Money

Agreement

provided,

among

things, as follows:
••to be placed in a protective trust for the
purpose of safeguarding the assets and
welfare of the seller to the extent that the
income she needs for personal welfare cannot
be preyed upon by others.5I

other

FREEBAIRN V, SCOTT

16.

Prior

to

MEMORANDUM DECISION

PAGE FOUR

the

closing

LaMar

Duncan,

attorney,

was

consulted by plaintiff and defendant regarding the creation of
the trust for the sale proceeds.

Mr. Duncan recommended that

instead of the trust, a guardianship be created.
17.

The closing for the sale of the property took place on

March 1, 1971.
18 , The guardianship was created and defendant was named
guardian for plaintiff on March 22, 1971.
19.

On March 23, 1971 plaintiff executed a warranty deed in

favor of Scott Investment Corporation, and retained no security
interest in the property despite the fact that defendant was to
make monthly payments for the purchase of the property.
20.

In

January

of

1972

defendant

exchanged

acquired from plaintiff in a four-way trade,
the

defendant

received

the

land

under

or

the

land

In the exchange,
around

the Metro

Building located at 431 South 300 East, Salt Lake City, Utah,
having a value of $76,000.00.
21.

The property

sold by plaintiff to Scott

Investment

Corporation^ who in turn conveyed the property to defendant was
exchanged for the Metro Building property.
22.

The party who obtained the property, formerly owned by

plaintiff, in the four-way exchange sold the subject property
within two years for $6,000.00 per acre,

FREEBAIRN V. SCOTT

23.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

PAGE FIVE

Real estate values increased dramatically immediately

after the subject sale.
24.

The land sold by plaintiff to defendant in 1971 was

retroactively appraised by two appraisers for this lawsuit and
they

established

values

for

the

property

in

1971

as being

$3,100.00 and $5,500.00 per acre.
25.

Plaintiff

during

her

adult

years

had

transacted a

number of land transactions, conducted her own business affairs,
attended college, was employed by the Deseret News, Salt Lake
Tribune and Brigham Young University.
26.

Plaintiff

has

been

diagnosed

as

a

paranoid

schizophrenic.
27.

Plaintiff

is

intelligent

and

educated,

and

could

factually understand the sale of property.
28.

Plaintiff

finances, but

is

not

a

good

manager

she has personally managed

of

her

her

personal

finances, even

though the court had appointed a guardian for her.
29.

Plaintiff received all of the payments from defendant

in accordance with the promissory note that was given for the
payment of the property.
30.
defendant,

LaMar
and

Duncan
the

acted

parties

as

attorney

relied

upon

for
his

plaintiff

and

representations

concernina the creation of the guardianship in lieu of the trust.

FREEBAIRN V. SCOTT

31.

PAGE SIX

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Prior to the creation of the guardianship, Mr. Duncan

reviewed the Earnest Money Agreement in behalf of plaintiff.
32.

The closing was held before the guardianship proceeding

was initiated.
33.

At the time of closing, a deed was not executed by

plaintiff to the buyer Scott Investment Corporation.
34.

After the appointment of the guardian, the plaintiff

and not the guardian executed a deed to the property to Scott
Investment Corporation on March 23, 1971, and on March 24, 1971
Scott Investment Corporation conveyed the property to defendant.
35.

A petition to approve the execution of a deed was not

submitted to the court.
36.

There

is

no

statutory

provision

that

precludes

a

guardian of a ward selling to a guardian, but the Court does not
condone or look upon with favor when a guardian purchases from a
ward.
CONCLUSIONS
The Court concludes as followsi
1.

The plaintiff was intelligent, educated and had the

ability to understand the terms of the sale despite her mental
illness.
2.

The appointment of a guardian following the sale was

not in and of itself a basis for voiding the sale.

FREEBAIRN V. SCOTT

3.

PAGE SEVEN

The defendant

MEMORANDUM DECISION

did not take advantage of plaintiff;

exercise undue influence over her; or perpetrate a fraud upon her
by purchasing plaintiff's property.
4.

The plaintiff did not lack the mental capacity to enter

into a legally binding contract.
5.

The failure to obtain court approval for the execution

of a deed after the guardian was appointed did not void the deed.
6.

The plaintiff had the contractual capacity to enter

into a legally binding contract.
7.

That plaintiff have judgment

of no cause of action

against defendant,
The Court refers the parties to defendant's Memorandum for
the case law,
Defendant's counsel shall prepare the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, and Decree accordingly.
Dated this

( 1

day of March, 1988.

JOHN A. ROKICH
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

FREEBAIRN V. SCOTT

MEMORANDUM DECISION

PAGE EIGHT

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the

foregoing

following, this

Memorandum

Decision,

postage

( I day of March, 1988:

Dean Becker, Esq.
4059 South 4000 West
West Valley City, Utah

84120

Timothy C. Houpt
Attorney for Plaintiff
419 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
David J. Jordan
Attorney for J. Russell Scott
50 S. Main, Suite 1600
P.O. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145

prepaid,

to

the

APPENDIX I: MEMORANDUM DECISION AND JUDGMENT
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
MARY JEAN FREEBAIRN,
Plaintiff,
vs.
J. RUSSELL SCOTT,

)
)
)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND JUDGMENT

)

PROBATE NO. 57693

)

Defendant.

)

The above-entitled matter was tried on the 12th day of
January, 1988.

Plaintiff was present and represented by Brian

M. Barnard and Timothy C. Houpt.
represented by David J. Jordan.

Defendant was present and
The Court heard the testimony

of witnesses and admitted documentary evidence.

At the

conclusion of the trial the Court advised counsel that closing
arguments would be continued to a future date.

On the 29th day

of January, 1988, counsel for the respective parties made their
closing arguments.
advisement.

The Court took the matter under

The Court having had an opportunity to review its'

notes, the Memoranda on file, the exhibits admitted, and the
pertinent authorities cited, now renders its decision.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff and defendant are first cousins who

inherited real property located near the mouth of Big
Cottonwood Canyon from their uncle.

2.

Defendant inherited 400 acres and plaintiff

inherited 60 acres from their uncle.
3.

Plaintiff, during the 1960's, sold 15 acres to

defendant.
4.

Plaintiff in 1968, entered into a trust agreement

with her brother Samuel Freebairn and his wife Agnes Freebairn
for the purpose of developing their respective properties.
5.

Samuel Freebairn encumbered the land by a

mortgage in favor of Beehive State Bank for $50,000,00.
6.

Samuel Freebairn died on July 30, 1969, and as a

result of his death Agnes Freebairn was unable to develop the
property or make the payments on the mortgage or pay the
property taxes,
7.

The 1968 trust agreement was prepared by Herbert

Halliday, attorney for Security Title Co., which was charged
with the administration of the trust,
8.

There was no evidence presented that at the time

of the creation of the 1968 trust agreement plaintiff was not
competent to contract.
9.

The 1968 trust was terminated by plaintiff and

Agnes Freebairn in March of 1971.

Mr. Halliday handled the

termination, but did not make a determination as to plaintiff's
mental status at that time.

10.

Plaintiff and Agnes Freebairn, facing the risk of

losing the property which was the subject matter of the 1968
trust agreement agreed to sell the property.
11.

Plaintiff and Agnes Freebairn contracted with LeR

Burton, a real estate agent, to sell the property.

Mr. Burton

listed the property for sale in the multiple listing book, and
advertised the same in a newspaper of state-wide circulation.
12.

Plaintiff and Agnes Freebairn established an

asking price, and sought out defendant to purchase the property.
13.

Plaintiff on January 13, 1971 entered into an

Earnest Money Agreement with Scott Investment Corporation,
owned by defendant, for the sale and purchase of approximately
25 acres for $65,000.00, with interest at the rate of 6% per
annum.
14.

Plaintiff had transacted a number of loans and

sales of parcels of land prior to this particular transaction,
and there was no evidence presented that she didn't understand
the nature of those transactions.
15.

The Earnest Money Agreement provided, among other

things, that the proceeds were to be:
"placed in a protective trust for the purpose of
safeguarding the assets and welfare of the seller
to the extent that the income she needs for
personal welfare cannot be preyed upon by others."
16.

Prior to the closing LaMar Duncan, attorney, was

consulted by plaintiff and defendant regarding the creation of

a trust for the sale proceeds.

Mr. Duncan recommended that

instead of a trust, a guardianship be created.
17.

The closing for the sale of the property took

place on March 1, 1971.
18.

The guardianship was created and defendant was

named guardian for plaintiff on March 22, 1971.
19.

On March 23, 1971 plaintiff executed a warranty

deed in favor of Scott Investment Corporation, and retained no
security interest in the property despite the fact that
defendant was to make monthly payments for the purchase of the
property.
20.

In January of 1972 defendant exchanged the land

acquired from plaintiff in a four-way trade.

In the exchange,

the defendant received the land under or around the Metro
Building located at 431 South 300 East, Salt Lake City, Utah,
having a value of $76,000.00.
21.

The property sold by plaintiff to Scott

Investment Corporation, who in turn conveyed the property to
defendant was exchanged for the Metro Building property.
22.

The party who obtained the property, formerly

owned by plaintiff, in the four-way exchange sold the subject
property within two years for $6,000.00 per acre.
23.

Real estate values increased dramatically

immediately after the subject sale.

24.

The land sold by plaintiff to defendant in 1971

was retroactively appraised by two appraisers for this lawsuit
and they established values for the property in 1971 as being
$3,100.00 and $5,500.00 per acre.

The Court finds that the

value established by defendants' appraiser more accurately
reflects the fair market value of the property at the time of
the sale from plaintiff to defendant.

Defendant's expert

further testified that if the sales price of the subject
property at the time of the creation of the 1968 trust
agreement were considered as an additional comparable, the
appraised value would be lower than $3,100.00 per acre.

The

Court finds that the sales price paid by defendant to plaintiff
was a fair price and consistent with the fair market value at
the time.
25.

Plaintiff during her adult years had transacted a

number of land transactions, conducted her own business
affairs, attended college, was employed by the Deseret News,
Salt Lake Tribune and Brigham Young University.
26.

Plaintiff's expert diagnosed plaintiff as a

paranoid schizophrenic,

Defendant's expert diagnosed plaintiff

as suffering from a dilusional paranoid disorder,
27.

Plaintiff is intelligent and educated, and could

and did factually understand the sale of property.
was competent to sell the property to defendant.

Plaintiff

28.

Plaintiff is not a good manager of her personal

finances, but she has personally managed her finances, even
though the court had appointed a guardian for her.
29.

Plaintiff received all of the payments from

defendant in accordance with the promissory note that was given
for the payment of the property.
30.

LaMar Duncan acted as attorney for plaintiff and

defendant, and the parties relied upon his representations
concerning the creation of the guardianship in lieu of a trust.
31.

Prior to the creation of the guardianship, Mr.

Duncan reviewed the Earnest Money Agreement in behalf of
plaintiff.
32.

The closing was held before the guardianship

proceeding was initiated,
33.

At the time of closing, a deed was not executed

by plaintiff to the buyer Scott Investment Corporation.
34.

After the appointment of the guardian, the

plaintiff and not the guardian executed a deed to the property
to Scott Investment Corporation on March 23, 1971, and on March
24, 1971 Scott Investment Corporation conveyed the property to
defendant.
35.

A petition to approve the execution of a deed was

not submitted to the court
36.

There is no statutory provision that precludes a

guardian of a ward selling to a guardian, but the Court does
not look upon with favor when a guardian purchases from a ward.

LAW
I.

Contracts by Persons Subject to Guardianships are not
Void.
The Utah Supreme Court has held that the appointment

of a guardian is only prima facie evidence of incompetence to
contract and may be rebutted.

In Hometown Finance Corp. v.

Frank, 13 Utah 2d 26, 368 P.2d 72, 76 (1962), the Court held:
[T]he appointment of a guardian is prima facie
evidence of the incompetency of the ward, but
. . . such prima facie [evidence] may be rebutted
by evidence which shows that the ward was
competent to understandingly manage his business
affairs and enter into contracts at a time of
making the alleged contract in question.
Accord, Brisacher v. Tracy-Collins Trust Co., 277 F.2d 519,
522-23 (10th Cir. I960).

In order to determine a person's

competency to contract, courts look to see if the person's
mental faculties were so deficient or impaired at the time the
contract was made that the person lacked the power to
comprehend the subject of the contract, its nature, and its
probable consequences.
433, 438 (1914)

Hatch v, Hatch, 46 Utah 218, 148 P.

The Court in Brisacher, supra, held that a

person may meet the statutory definition of the mental
condition necessary to establish a guardianship and
nevertheless be competent to contract under the Hatch test.
As the Court in Brisacher held, "[T]he recognition by a court
in Utah that a person is incompetent to manage his affairs
[under U.C.A. 75-13-20] is not tantamount to an adjudication

that he is incapable of intelligently entering a contract."
Brisacher, 277 F.2d at 522.

As stated above, the Court finds

that plaintiff was competent.
II.

The Transaction was Fair and Therefore Valid.
In Cunningham v. Cunningham, 690 P.2d 549, 553 (Utah

1984), the Court held that the existence of a confidential
relationship between contracting parties does not make the
contract void.

The Court stated:

When a confidential relationship exists between
parties, and a transaction occurs that benefits
the one in whom the confidence is placed, a
presumption arises that the transaction is
unfair. This shifts to the benefiting party the
burden to persuade the Court that there is no
fraud or undue influence exercised toward the
other.
The principle applied by the Utah Supreme Court in
Cunningham v. Cunningham is followed in many other
jurisdictions.

For example, in Egr v. Egr, 170 Or. 1, 131

P.2d 198, 201 (1942) the Court held:
The law seems to be well settled where one
accepts a confidential or fiduciary relationship
to another as that of a guardian and ward . . .
where the donee or grantee is supposed to
exercise an unusual and commanding influence over
the grantor, courts will set aside the conveyance
unless the grantee can show that the transaction
was fair and without fraud or undue influence.
See also Matter of Estate of Nelson, 134 Ariz. 439, 657 P.2d
437, 430 (1982); Lindsay v. Gibson, 635 P.2d 331, 332-33
(Okla. 1981); In Re Guardianship of Chandos, 18 Ariz. 583, 504

P.2d, 524, 526 (1972); Nelson v. Gossage, 152 Kan. 805, 107
P.2d 682, 684-85 (1940).

In this jurisdiction the effect of

the fiduciary relationship is not to invalidate the contract
but rather to shift the burden to the fiduciary to prove that
the transaction was fair and without fraud or undue influence.
Defendant has met that burden.
CONCLUSIONS
The Court concludes as follows:
1.

The plaintiff was intelligent, educated and had

the ability to understand the terms of the sale despite her
mental illness.
2.

The appointment of a guardian following the sale

was not in and of itself a basis for voiding the sale.
3.

The defendant did not take advantage of

plaintiff; exercise undue influence over her; or perpetrate a
fraud upon her by purchasing plaintiff's property.
4.

The plaintiff did not lack the mental capacity to

enter into a legally binding contract,
5.

The failure to obtain court approval for the

execution of a deed after the guardian was appointed did not
void the deed.
6.

The plaintiff had the contractual capacity to

enter into a legally binding contract,
7.

That plaintiff have judgment of no cause of

action against defendant.

Accordingly it is hereby Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed
that plaintiff have judgment of no cause of action against
defendant.

This action is hereby dismissed with prejudice.

Dated this y < day of April, 1988.
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